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EDITORIAL.
With this number the present staff and
management sever their connection with
the FORUM. Before doing so, however,
they wish to extend their thanks to all
those who have been instrumental in aiding them in their work, both with assistance and by words ofencouragement. Our
labors have been much lightened thereby.
The FoRum has enjoyed a successful year
and has bright prospects for the future.
It is the intention of the new management
to commence publication earlier in the
school year. The FoRumr, while bidding
its friends adieu for the Summer, hopes to
greet them all next October.
William C. Allison, Esq., of Philadelphia, one of the Board of Incorporators,
and a member of the class of 1892, has
authorized the Dean to announce for the
next and the following years a prize of not
less than $25 for excellence in some work
hereafter to be designated. This is a step
in the right direction. Friends of the
school could much assist it by placing at
the disposal of the authorities sums of
money to be expended in prizes of various
sorts.
The address of the Hon. Win. B. Hornblower was one of the best yet delivered
since the institution of the school. The subject was well understood by the entire audi-

ence, and the orator at once created an interest in his audience by the happy and fluent manner of his delivery and frequently
awakened enthusiasm by happy hits. The
self-control of the orator was manifested
when, during the delivery of his address,
being interrupted by a great outburst of
applause at the entrance of the soldier boys
of the class in full uniform, returning from
Camp Alger to graduate, he remarked that
when the future Grants and Shermanswere
seated he would resume. His exhortation
to the class and closing remarks were extremely'felicitous. Mlr. Hornblowernot only
delivered an agreeable and fascinating
address which held the close attention of
his audience to the end, but also proved
himself a most charming gentleman to
those with whom he came in contact.
Two new incorporators were elected at
the late commencement. They are John
L. Shelly, Esq., of Mechanicsburg, Pa.,
and Hon. Robert W. Archibald, President
Judge ofthe courts of Lackawanna county.
A NEW LIBRARY BUILDING.
Steps were taken by the Board of Incorporators at the late meeting, looking towards the erection of a new library building on the lot in the rear of the Law
School. A committee was appointed to
confer with the authorities of the college
which owns the ground, with regard to its
occupancy by a new building, and it is
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expected that a large library room will be
provided, in which many times more
books than are now in the library may be
housed, and ampler desk room may be
furnished. The room now occupied by the
books will be used as a waiting room, and
in this way some of the noise which often
interrupts work at the assembling of the
classes will be avoided.

wearing the uniform of a U. S. volunteer,
and as many more sought to be enlisted
but were unsuccessful for various causes.
Those in the service are Feight and Hugh
Millei of the Senior Class, Devall, Herbaan,
Murr, Shalters and,Vowinckle of the Middle Class and Gilliland, Horn and Stevens
of the Junior Class. Chas. E. Daniels, of
the Middle Class, is war correspondent for
the Scranton Truth, and is at Camp Alger.

A LIBRARY FUND.
There was one novel incident during the
late Commencement. On Tuesday, June
7th, a committee of the Middle Class, composed of five members, of which Mi. Gabriel H. Moyer was chairman, called upon
the Dean and presented him with $45 in
gold, as a gift of the class to the school, for
the purchase of books for the library. In
tendering the money, Mr.Moyer pleasantly
alluded to the great usefulness of the library, and to the appreciation of the students of the efforts making to increase it,
and stated that the class had thought that
their example might initiate a custom
which in the course of years would very
materially enlarge it. The Dean received
the money in the name of the incorporators of the school, expressing his satisfaction that the Middle Class had fallen on so
happy a thought, and his conviction that
future classes would be induced to emulate
the example thus furnished. He also
thanked the class for this evidence of their
hearty goodwill towards the school.
OUR SOLDIERS.
The Cuban Question and the Policy of
the Administration, previous to the declaration of war, were subjects that when
mentioned in our library never failed to
provoke an argument. These were merely preliminary skirmishes as it were, and
served to arouse the fighting spirit among
the members of the school. Indeed, the
profession of law is such as to cultivate a
combative disposition, as one following it
is almost constantly engaged in disputes.
There are many prominent lawyers who
are to-day no more prominent as jurists
than as soldiers. It is not surprising then
that the President's call for volunteers
met with a ready response among the
members of our school. Ten are now

THE BACCALAUREATE SERMON.
On Sunday, June 5, Dr. Geo. Edward
Reed, D. D., LL. D., preached the baccalaureate sermon to the graduating classes
of the college and law school.
The theme of the eloquent discourse
was "The Lessons of a Great Life."
President Reed selected the career of
William Ewart Gladstone as a noble type
of a great and beautiful life. The eulogy
pronounced upon the life of Gladstone
teemed with eloquent passages and magnificent tributes to the Grand Old Man of
England.
The spacious auditorium of Allison M.
E. church was crowded to its utmost capacity and all went away feeling that they
had indeed listened to a master.
At the close of the sermon President
Reed addressed the law graduates as follows:
To the Gentlemen of the Law School of the
Class of '98:
"To you, as to the men of our college,
has come an impressive period in your
lives-the period of your graduation. You,
however differ from those we have addressed in the one important respect that,
while to the majority of these there remain further years of university or professional study before entrance upon the
active duties of the careers they proposeyou, largely, are at the end of school study
anl discipline save as some of you, I trust
many, may return fo. a third and final
year. In a few days many of you will be
admitted at various bars and the duties of
your profession will have begun. That
you will be successful, the majority ofyou,
at least, we have no doubt. This, largely,
has been the history of the men who, in
these recent years, have been graduated
from the Dickinson School of Law. We
have accustomed ourselves to expect that
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our men will win. We expect it of the
class of '98.
But, after all, make not an idol of mere
success, of the "getting on" so insisted
.upon in our American life. To be ambitious is right, but let your ambitions be
lawfuL To gain place and power is commendable, but place and power purchased
at the cost of a good name-by unworthy
truckling for popular favor, by having
one's hands stained by base bribes of any
sort, are purchased at too dear a price.
Repudiate forever the base insinuationtoo commonly admitted by lawyers themselves-that the profession of law is one in
which no man may hope to succeed who
will -not sometimes stoop to subterfuge, deception and fraud. Such an assertion is a
slander upon the names and lives of the
thousands of great lawyers and statesmen
whose illustrious careers adorn and dignify the annals of the legal, political and
social life of the nations to which they belong. The last man in the World to admit
it should be one who is himself a lawyer.
It is not so. To say it, is but to utter a
falsehood in the hope that by the uttering
of the falsehood disobedience to the great
idea of human duty may be covered over
and the voice of conscience silenced.
If the life of a lawyer, a man whose
business is the interpretation of law, the
protection of the rights and principles of
justice,--cannot be cleanly lived,-then,in God's name, what life can be ?
Remember that the greatest of all successes is the success of character. No man
has a better chance to serve his generation
than has the upright, conscientious lawyer. No men in history better served their
generations than have the great jurists,
advocates and counsellors whose learning
has enriched, whose services have adorned
and whose characters have dignified the
times in which they lived.
Gentlemen of the Law class of '98 Hail! hail and farewell !
COM

ENCEMENT.

The annual commencement of Dickinson School of Law was held in Bosler Hall,
Tuesday evening, June 7. The hall was
filled with an unusually large audience.
On the platform sat Dr. Reed, Dean Trickett, Hon. Wm. B. Hornblower, the law

school faculty, distinguished alumni and
eminent members of the Carlisle Bar.
After prayer by Rev. J. Y. Dobbins, and
a selection by the Chappel Orchestra of
Williamsport, one of the best in the State,
the class oration was delivered by Sylvester B. Sadler, son of Ex-Judge Wilbur F.
Sadler, oT Carlisle. This oration is printed
in full elsewhere.
Upon the conclusion of Mr. Sadler's address, Dr. Reed introduced Hon. Wm. B.
Hornblower, of New York City, who delivered a masterful address to the graduates on the subject, "The Common Sense
of the Common Law," which appears in
full in another column.
In the early part of the address the
orator was interrupted by a sudden outburst of applause, which was caused by
the sudden entrance and unexpected return of those members of the graduating
class who had responded to the call of the
President for volunteers, fresh from the
stirring scenes of war. They were Messrs.
Miller, Herman and Shalters.
Devall,
Feight and Vowinckle came earlier in the
day from Mt. Gretna. The soldiers were
the first to receive their degree, and in
their uniform, with the camp dust still
upon them, aroused a great deal of enthusiasm.
The degrees were then conferred upon
the graduates, a full list of whom appears
below.
After music by the orchestra, the exercises were concluded, thus closing one of
the most successful law school commencements ever held in Carlisle.
THE GRADUATES.

Barker, Robert H., Philadelphia; Daniels, Charles E., Scranton; Feight, Alfred
J., New Cumberland; Irvin, Blake,
Brookville; Irving, Robert W., New York
City; Knupp, Harvey E., Harrisburg;
Miller, Hugh R., Carlisle; Moser, Frederick B., Shamokin; Shcener, Andrew G.,
Mt. Carmel; Sjmith, Jonathan R., Philadelphia; Berntheisel, Cleon Al., Columbia;
Caldweli, John B. T., Altoona; Capwell,
Ruel U., Scranton; Devall, Arthur M.,
Wharton; Duffy, Martin F., St. Clair;
Haas, Jackson 0., Hepler; Hare, Samuel
B., Altoona; Herman, Adair, Carlisle;
Herr, Martin R., Merchantville, N. J. ;
Hutchinson, Edwin G., Warrior's Mark;
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Lafferty, Francis, Ferrell, N.J.; Light,
Ralph H., Lebanon; Line, J. Harvey,
Carlisle; Miller, Fred. C., Harrisburg;
Morgan, Albert T., Washington; Morrow,
Frank T., Altoona; Moyer, Gabriel H.,
Palmyra ; Murr, Miles H., Lititz ; Pepper,
Thomas B., Georgetown, Del; Persing,
Harry M., Bear Gap; Radle, Philip E.,
Georgetown; Roth, Claude L., Pottsville,
Corner; Sadler, Sylvester B., Carlisle;
Schmidt, Paul J., MinersVille; Shalters,
Charles, Reading; Shissler, W.
K.,
Miftersville; Snyder,W. Lloyd, Columbia;
Strouss, Frank H., Mt. Carmel; Stucker,
Robert, Harrisburg; Sullivan, J. Austin,
Altoona; Treibly, Walter C., Fountain
Springs; Vowinckle, George F., Clarion;
Wetzel, G. Frank, Carlisle.
USHERS.
Frank B. Sellers, Jr., George W. Aubrey,
Herman M. Sypherd, D. Edward Long,
Merkel Landis, A. Frank John, Marlin
Wolf, J. Kirk Bosler.
COMMITTEE.

Ralph H. Light, Chairman; William
K. Shissler, Francis Lafferty, Miles H.
Murr, Sylvester B. Sadler.
PRIZES AWARDED.

The Junior prize, awarded by the Dean
for the best examination in real property,
to D. Edward Long, of Fayetteville. The
prize consists of Dunlap's book of forms, 1
volume, and Brewster's Practice, 2 volumes ; middle class prize awarded by the
Dean for best briefs in moot court to Claude
L. Roth, of Pottsville. This prize consists
of Pepper and Lewis' digest of statutes, 3
volumes, and Brewster's Practice, 2 volumes; the Edward Thompson Company
prize awarded by Hon. Charles A. Barnett,
the ex-judgeof the 41st judicial district, for
the best essay on orphans' court sales in
Pennsylvania to Sylvester B. Sadler, of
Carlisle; the prize consists of a set of the
Encyclopedia of pleading and practice. In
awarding this prize Judge Barnett said: I
have read with interest and considered
with as great care the papers which you
did me the honor to submit to my judgment as the allotted time and other demands upon us would permit.
It is proper to say of them generally
that they are all of such degree of excellence that they reflect great credit upon

the plan of teaching capable of producing
such results and demonstrate that the
Dickinson School of Law is second to none
in the ability to so train students that they
may reach eminence in their profession.
Where all are so good it is very difficult to
decide which is best, and it is not without
much hesitation that the decision is made.
(Mr. Barnett did not know the author of
any of the papers).
The judge further
says of Mr. Sadler's papers: Its distinguishing feature consists in its being not
so largely compilation of sometimes conflicting decisions, but that it admits of
some originality in announcing in the author's own way under his different subdivisions certain propositions which he
supports by the authorities cited.
MEETING OF THE INCORPORATORS.
At four o'clock, Tuesday afternoon,
June 7, the annual meeting of the Incorporators of Dickinson School of Law was
held in Law School Building. Judge
Archibald, of Scranton, and John L.
Shelly, Esq., of Mechanicsburg, were
elected trustees in place of the Hon. Jacob
Tome and Herman Bosler, deceased;
Judge.Edward W. Biddle, of Carlisle,was
elected a member of the Executive Committee, to take the place made vacant by
the death of Hon. John Herman Bosler.
A committee was appointed to confer
with a committee of the college proper,
with reference to the erection of the new
law library building on West Pomfret
street.

THE SOCIETIES.
ALLISON SOCIETY.
DR. TRICKETT'S LECTURE.
The Allison Society during the last
month has been fortunate in having lecturers to appear before them on their meeting night. Dr. Reed appeared twice, and
delivered two of his lectures on oratory,
which are noted elsewhere. On May 18th
Dr. Trickett appeared and lectured on International Law. His lecture was only
announced on the morning of the day he
lectured, yet a large audience, composed of
people from the town and college, besides
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the students of the school, were there to
greet him. His lecture was agrand effort.
He stated in a clear manner, succinctly,
the rules of property which belligerents
are bound to observe. At the close of the
lecture resolutions were passed, extending
the thanks of the audience to the lecturer.
The manner in which his lecture was received, and the close attention paid him,
attest the hold the Dean has upon his
students.
At the last election of the society the
following officers were elected to serve for
the Spring term next session : President,
Charles Moyer; Vice President, McMeans;
Secretary, Sypherd; District Attorney,
Wood; Executive Committee, Capwell,
Wood and Freed.

following members of the fraternity: Hon.
Wm. B. Hornblower, LL. D., Hon. E. W.
Biddle, J. W. Wetzel, Esq., H. S. Stuart,
Esq., Chester C. Basehore, Esq. The invited guests, Dr. William Trickett and A.
G. Miller, Esq., the latter being a classmate of Mr. Hornblower while at Princeton, also responded to toasts. In addition
to the foregoing, the followingmembersof
the fraternity were present: W.H.Walker,
Esq., Bellefonte ; Geo. B. Somerville,
Esq., Athens; J, S. Omwake, Esq., Shippensburg; Albert Livingston, Esq., Philadelphia; J. C. Kissell, Esq., Carlisle;
Charles E. Daniels, G. Fred. Vowinckle,
Alfred J. Feight, A. T. Morgan, G. H.
Moyer, Win. K. Shissler, Robert H. Barker, Herman M. Sypherd, Marlin Wolf
and A. Frank John.

THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
PRESIDENT REEDS LECTURE.
By election at the last regular meeting
of the Dickinson Society, the following
officers were elected to serve for the opening term next session: President, George
W. Aubrey; Vice President, George W.
Schuyler; Secretary, Dr. John D. T. Davis;
Treasurer, Win. Flanigan; Sergeant-atArms, L. Hildreth; Prothonotary, Wencel
Hartman, Jr. ; Recorder, Eli Saulsbury;
Register of Wills, Martin Wolf; Justice of
the Peace, Frank Fenton; Sheriff, Walter
Henry; District Attorney, Miss Julia A.
Radle; Clerk of the Courts, Frank Laubenstein. It is needless to add that the society's work, and the results obtained, exceeded even the most favorable predictions.
THE HON. WM. B. HORNBLOWER INITIATED INTO THE DELTA CMI
FRATERNITY.
The Dickinson Chapter of the Delta Chi
Fraternity has added to its illustrious roll
the name of the Hon. Wim. B. Hornblower, the eminent jurist and polished
orator of New York city.
The ceremonies incident to the initiation
were conducted in the spacious parlors of
the home of Hon. E. W. Biddle, one of the
most distinguished honorary members of
the local Chapter.
After the honorable gentleman had been
initiated into the mysteries of Delta Chi,
the members gathered around the festive
board. Toasts were responded to by the

President Reed delivered the two closing
lectures of the series before the school May
30th and 27th, the subjects being respectively 'Types of Great Orators" and "The
Art of Discourse."
The large number of students who were
present enjoyed greatly these magnificent
and instructive lectures.
THE THESES.
We give alist of the subjects of the theses
required from members of the graduating
class of '98. Some of the class members
had only completed theirs in part when
the call for troops induced them to enlist.
Therefore, the schedule is not complete:
Dissolution of Corporations-C.N.BERNTHEISEL.
Mortgages-J. B. T. CALDIVELL.

Competency of Witnesses According to
the Statutes of Pennsylvania-R. U. CAPWELL.
Witnesses-A. M. DEVALL.
Distress for Rent--.
F. DUFFY.

Appeal from Justices of the Peace-J.
0. HAAS.
Domestic Attachment-Al. R. HERR.

Jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace in
Contracts-E. G. HUTCHisoN.
Attachments in New Jersey-F. LAFFERTY.

Collateral
LIGHT.

Inheritance

Tax - R. H.
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rights, is scarcely conscious that there is
such a thing as law, except when called
upon from time to time to perform his
duty as a juryman in the courts of justice.
The merchant, so long as he and the par1es Gestae-F.T. MORROW.
ties with whom he deals are paying and
Jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace in
receiving payment regularly for the goods
Contract Cases-F. B. MOSER.
dealt in, is quite unconscious of the existRights and Liabilities of Parties to Acence of the intricate law of sales; but when,
commodation Papers-G. H. MOYER.
receiving a shipment of goods which, in
Divorce-M. H. MuRR.
his judgment, are not in accordance with
Rights and Powers of Women as Against
the goods ordered from his vendor, he
the World at Large-T. B. PEFFER.
declines to pay for them on that ground,
Widow's Exemption-H. M. PERSING.
he finds himself suddenly confronted,
Powers, Duties and Liabilities of Conwhen he consults his legal adviser, .by that
stables-P. E. RADLE.
intricate system of rules which distinBridges Over Navigable Rivers-C. L.
guishes between express warranties and
ROTH.
implied warranties, executed and exConfessions-S. B. SADLER.
ecutory sales, and which (in most of our
Circumstantial Evidence--P.J.SCHrxIDT.
States) brings him face to face with that
The Criminally Irresponsible, and Recurious heritage of our law coming down
lating More Particularly to the Mentally
from the middle of the seventeenth cenDiseased-W. K. SHISSLER.
tury, known as the Statute of Frauds, a
Foreign Attachments-W. L. SNYDER.
statute which I believe is not in force in
Defalcation-F. H. STRouss.
Pennsylvania. So the man who underCauses of Divorce in Pennsylvania-R.
takes to appropriate to himself his neighSTUCKER.
bor's goods, either by stealth or force, finds
Rights and Liabilities of Members of
himself at once made conscious of the exBuilding Associations-J. A. SULLIVAN.
istence of the criminal law, with its pains
Attachment Executions-W. G. TREiand penalties.
ELY.
Not only so, but under our peculiar sysPolice Powers of the State-G. F.
tem of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, as inWETZEL.
herited by all but one of our American
THE COMMON SENSE OF THE COM- Commonwealths, law is actually made by
violation, so that law-breakers become unMON LAW.
wittingly and unwillingly law-makers.
I need not remind you that the law of
Address Before the Dickinson School
England, which we have inherited and
of Law, June 7, 1898, by William B.
developed, was not formulated by the
.Hornblower,LL. D.
legislative body, nor by the crown, nor by
St. Paul tells us that " The strength of
bodies of learned jurists, into Pandects and
Institutes and Codes. Ithasnotbeen our
sin is the law." Thousands of learned
Anglo-Saxon way of doing things to make
commentators and preachers have disout elaborate schemes of legal rules to
cussed from their various theological
standpoints the meaning and bearing of govern future cases, and to enact such
rules into statutes. On the contrary, the
this phrase. Without trenching upon the
courts have been left free to decide upon
domain of theology, I assert the converse
actual controversies as they arose, and to
of this proposition as true from the standpoint ofjurisprudence,namely, the strength formulate rules to meet the situation beof the lawissin. Bythis I mean that law fore them, which rules, when set forth in
reported cases, have become precedents for
makes itself felt and known only when it
is violated.
future decisions. Thus has grown up that
The ordinary citizen, pursuing his regu- unique system of "judge-made law,"
which has been the object of ridicule and
lar avocations, living up to his contract
abuse from continental jurists, and from
obligations with his neighbor, and refrainsuch theorists as Bentham, but which, in
ing from interference with his neighbor's
Contributory Negligence at Railroad
Crossings-. H. LINE.
Discharge of Sureties-F. C. MILLER.
Proof of Handwriting-A. T. MORGAN.

0
4r

GI

SL
v

i 4

ii

f

-

-

4
-

t

THE FOR1JM.
spite of the shafts of ridicule and the bombardments of abuse, is still the system
under which England and most of the
States of this country live and thrive.
take, for instance, the law of slander
T
and libel. A man having a disagreement
with a neighbor, openly denounces him as
a liar. He is sued for damages by his
neighbor for the offensive words thus
spoken. The court declares that spoken
words are not actionable, although defamatory, unless they impute a crime or an
infectious disease, or are of such a character as to affect the reputation of the person
attacked in his business or profession.
The wrongdoer thus emboldened, proceeds
to write a letter -to the newspapers, in
which he repeats the accusation that his
neighbor is a liar. A new suit is brought
against him, and he then learns to his
dismay that any defamatory matter, embodied in writing or printing or pictures,
and published, constitutes libel, and is actionableper se if calculated to hold up to
ridicule or contempt.
It is thus-that the common law has been
built up, and thus that, as I have above
stated, the law-breaker becomes the lawmaker. Unscientific it is called; yes, but
eminently practical, like all other AngloSaxon institutions. Theoretically, nothing can be more absurd than that the law
should be made expostfacto, as Bentham
puts it; practically, however, the law is so
made. We do not now claim with Coke
and Blackstone, that the common law is
the "perfection of reason," butwe can still
claim that it is in the main the embodiment of common sense. We do not undertake to define in advance what ought
to be done or ought to be left undone, but
we do uladertake to say what ought not to
have been done or ought to have been left"
undone, and thus we establish a practical
precedent for the future conduct of the individual and the future guidance of courts
of justice. Thus the common law is a
growth and not a creation; it is an evolution and not an artificially constructed
fabric of preconceived rules.
Just why our jurisprudence assumed
this character is a little difficult to explain.
Why our ancestors should have differentiated themselves in this respect from the
continental nations does not clearly appear, It was not because the early jurists

in England were unacquainted with the
civil law, for the treatise of Bracton is
manifestly founded upon and borrows from
that system of jurisprudence. The Normans brought with them from the continent the French language and French
ideas, and incorporated in our system of
law many French phrases, which remain
to this day in a somewhat garbled form.
The terms, Cetui que trust, Executor de
son tort and Estoppel in pais,are still live
terms in our law, and are used by us every
day in legal arguments in our courts of
justice. Yet, just as the Saxon language
held its own against the superior culture,
wealth and power of the Norman conquerors, and has remained to this day the
bone and sinew of the English language,
borrowing and appropriating to its own
use such French synonyms as it needed to
embellish and enlarge its vocabulary, so
the purely English ideas of jurisprudence
have remained the bone and sinew of the
common law, borrowing and appropriating such maxims, phrases and principles
from the civil law as have from time to
time seemed to the English judges and
chancellors desirable or necessary to
broaden and liberalize the insular English
system of law.
Sir Frederick Pollock and Dr. Maitland,
in their most valuable and interesting
work on the "History of English Law,"
thus strongly point out the results of this
rejection by the English courts and people
of the civil law, and their adoption of their
own unique system of jurisprudence.
Speaking of the period between 1154 and
1272, they say (Vol. II, p. 670):
"We have stood at the parting of the
ways of the two most vigorous systems of
law that the modern world has seen, the
French and the English. Not about what
may seem the weightier matters of jurisprudence do these sisters quarrel, but
about I mere matters ofprocedure,' as some
would call them, the one adopting the
canonical inquest of witnesses; the other
retaining, developing, transmitting the
old enquete dupays. But the fate of tw6
national laws lies here. Which country
made the.wiser choice no Frenchman and
no Englishman can impartially say; no
one should be judge in his own cause.
But of this there can be no doubt, that it
was for the good of the whole world that
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one race stood apart from its neighbors,
turned away its eyes at an early time from
the fascinating pages of the Corpwts Jurs,
and, more Roman than the Romanists,
made the grand experiment of a new
formulary system. Nor can we part with
this age without thinking once more of the
permanence of its work. Those few men
who were gathered at Westminster round
Pateshull and Raleigh and Bractou were
penning writs that would run in the name
of kingless commonwealths on the other
shore of the Atlantic ocean. They were
making right and wrong forus and forour
children."
As will be seen from the above quotatioti
from those eminent authors, they regard
the differences between the two systems of
law as rather differences in procedure than
in substance. This, of course, is not literally true, but only measurably so. The
whole substance of our law of real property
and very much of our law of personal property, and of the law of torts, are essentially
English. On the other hand, the law of
contracts and the rules of equity, which
are in general based upon abstract principles of justice and fair dealing, are to a
large extent identical with the Roman law.
The courts of equity were originally administered by ecclesiastics, the early chancellors being Churchmen, familiar with
the canon law, and, through the canon
law, with the Roman law. Thus equity
adopted bodily many of the principles of
the P.6nman law. As to contracts, personal
property and partnership, the principles
of the Roman law were borrowed or copied
in the early history of English jurisprudence, as appears by the treatises of Bracton and others. It, is, however, true that
the most striking difference between the
English system and the Continental systems of law is in its outward procedure.
The extraordinary distinction between
law and equity, which persists both in
England and in this country in spite of
legislative attempts to abolish it, even as
in your State by your earlier statutes abolishing equity jurisdiction altogether, is
unique injurisprudence,and is theoretically
indefensible, and yet is so workable in
practice as to exhibit the persistence I have
just indicated.
One of the most remarkable distinctions
between the civil and the common law

systems is with regard to the rules of evidence. The law of evidence, as we understand it and apply it every day in our
courts ofjustice, is peculiarly our own, and
it is illustrative of the practical and antitheoretical character of the English and
American mind. The rejection of hearsay
evidence, for instance, is absolutely indefensible as a matter of logic and theory,
and yet as a practical safeguard against
error, and as a practical guide to truth in
the administration of justice, no rule has
ever been devised by the wit of man which
has been more useful, or which is more
essential to the protection of right and the
prevention of wrong. The recent trial of
Monsieur Zola in Paris hs illustrated most
forcibly the advantage of our own system
of trial evidence. Nothing could be more
grotesque, from our standpoint, than the
mode of procedure adopted in that case,
where all sorts of hearsay evidence and
opinion evidencewere admitted,and where
everybody seemed to have a right to be
heard, except the defendant and his counsel, and everything was considered relevant to the issues before the court, except
the evidence of those who knew the facts,
and who were in a position to tell them.
On the other hand, contrast with this
the recent trial in your own State of the
sheriff indicted for murder in firing upon
rioters. Here was a trial as to which public excitement waq intense; the passions
and prejudices of certain classes of the people were aroused, and the well-being of the
community as a whole was at stake. It
was an exceedingly difficult task to hold
steady the scales of justice, yet through it
all, defying or ignoring threats, and at the
risk of personal danger, one of your judges
applied firmly and steadily the AngloSaxon rules of evidence and the AngloSaxon rules of fair play, and the result was
that the trial was conducted with a dignity
and impartiality that commanded the admiration of the whole country.
The crucial test came upon Judge Woodward as it came upon Commodore Dewey,
not by selection in advance for arduous
and severe duty in a great crisis, but in the
ordinary course of professional and judicial
routine. Sent to command the Asiatic
squadron in time of profound peace, and
with no thought of impending war, the
hero of Manila was a representative of the
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whole body 'of American commodores;
Judge Woodward was a representative of
the whole body of Americanjudges. Each
was equal to the emergency in which he
found himself.
The reason given for the strict rules of
the common lav as to the exclusion of
hearsay testimony, by the writers on the
subject, is the growth and development of
the jury system, and the necessity of excluding from the consideration of the jury
testimony which, while relevant to the
issues, would nevertheless be unreliable
and would tend to mislead them. Sir
Henry Maine says:
"There is much probability that our
English law of evidence would never have
come into existence if we had not continued much longer than other Western
societies the separation of the province of
the judge from the province of the jury;
and, in fact, the English rules of evidence
are never very scrupulously attended to
by tribunals which, like the Court of
Chancery, adjudicate both on law and on
fact." -(Maine's Village Communities, 3d
Ed., 302.)
Prof. Tbayer, of Harvard Law School,
says :
"Some things are rejected as being of
too slight a significance, or as having too
conjectural and remote a connection;
others as being dangerous, and likely to
be misused or overestimated by a jury;
others as being impolitic, e. g., unsafe for
the State; others on the bare ground of
precedent. It is this sort of thing, as I
said before-the rejection of what is really
probative, on one or another practical
ground-which is the characteristic thing
in the law of evidence, marking, as it does,
the influence of the jury system, which
gave rise to it."-(3 Harv. Law Rev.,142-7.)
I am not prepared to agree to the proposition, that in trials before a judge, without a jury, it is safe or desirable to allow
hearsay evidence. It is quite true that, as
pointed out by many writers on jurisprudence, all testimony is theoretically and
logically relevant which would influence
the judgment of a reasonable man in the
ordinary affairs of life.
This definition of relevant evidence,
while theoretically correct, is practically
unworkable.
If I am told by a man whom I meet on

the street that he has just met a friend,
who told him that there was a large fire
raging in the upper part of New York city,
in the neighborhood of my own residence,
I should, as a reasonably prudent man,
act upon that information, and should immediately start homeward to investigate
the condition of my household and property. I should do this, even though I
might not absolutely believe the testimony, there being several elements of uncertainty in the situation, owing, first, to
the question of the veracity of the party
who gives me the information; secondly,
his accuracy in repeating what he has
been informed-he may have entirely misunderstood what was told him; he may
have been informed that the fire was in
the upper part of the city of Boston, or up
the river, at Albany; thirdly, the veracity
of the informant; and, fourthly, the
grounds of his knowledge or the sources of
his information.
It is therefore manifest that the test as
to what would influ.uce the conduct of a
reasonable man is not sufficient, and in the
practical administration of justice there
must be some hard and fast rule laid down
in order that the trial of issues of fact may
proceed with something approaching to
scientific accuracy.
As I have already stated, I do not at all
believe that it is safe even for a judge without a jury to be allowed free range over all
the fields of possible inquiry, and to be
limited only by a logical and theoretical
standard of relevancy. When judges become triers of fact they are exposed, if not
to the same degree, at any rate in like
manner as juries, to be misled and prejudiced by the introduction of hearsay
evidence. Not only so, but the record
becomes cumbered with all sorts of statements, the weight and credibility of which
require to be determined by the trialjudge,
and the issues, instead of being simplified,
are obscured. The four elements of doubt
in hearsay evidence are present in cases
tried before a judge as before a jury, viz.:
First, the veracity of the witness; second,
his correct understanding of the information he has received; third, the veracity of
his informant; and, fourth, the sources of
knowledge of the informant.
The judge is entitled to be protected
against testimony involving so many ele-
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ments of doubt. He has the right to protest against being called upon to guess as
to the weight and effect of testimony involving these uncertainties.
In our own State of New York we have
provided by our Constitution that cases in
equity shall be tried in like manner as
cases at law; and the same rules of evidence are applied, notwithstanding that
such cases are always tried by a judge
without a jury, except where special issues
are framed.
I should look with great misgiving upon
any attempt to dispense with this most
wholesome limitation upon the rules of
evidence, as opening the door to all sorts
of absolutely worthless testimony. In
other words, I do not regard the rule of
exclusion as to hearsay evidence as a mere
arbitrary rule of procedure, adopted for the
purposes of convenience, but I regard it as
resting upon substantial justice, and as a
most salutary safeguard to the individual
citizen from prejudiced and erroneous
judgments. So loug as we require testimony at first hand by persons who are
prepared to testify under oath as to what
they have seen or know of their own
knowledge, we have at least a guaranty of
the personal responsibility of the person
so testifying.
I have called attention to this branch of
the law of evidence as exhibitiug the most
practical side of the common-law system
of jurisprudence, in order to emphasize the
general character of that jurisprudence
as a whole.
So the rule, that where there is a written
instrument, that is the best evidence of its
contents; and parol evidence thereof can
only be introduced on proof of its loss or
destruction, is an eminently common sense
rule, which tends to minimize error and
perjury.
So also the rule that parol evidence cannot be introduced to modify or vary a
written instrument, except where the instrument itself is shown not to represent
the real agreement of the parties.
It was at one-time understood outside of
the State of Pennsylvania that your courts
had abandoned this salutary rule of common law evidence, and that in all cases
parol evidence was admissible to vary or
explain a written agreement.
This understanding, however, if I am

not mistaken, was incorrect. It grew out
of the fact that Courts of Chancery and
equity jurisprudence were for a long time
unknown in your State, and that your
common law courts were compelled ex
necessitaterei to enforce equitable principles. Hence, in an action upon a written
instrument, your courts allowed evidence
which, in other jurisdictions, would have
been proper only in a suit in equity to reform the agreement.
Your later cases, as I understand them,
are quite clear to the effect that parol modification of written instruments is only
permissible where the instrument is not
the real agreement of the parties.
We shall do well to abide by and to carefully conserve the rules of evidence laid
down by the judicial expounders of our
common law, and not beseduced by plausible fancies of theoretical reformers into letting down the ba-s and allowing "logical
relevancy" to supplant the tests of practical expediency.
As Mr. Justice Stephen says in his Introduction to the Law of Evidence:
"The law of England on the subject to
which it refers is full of sagacity and practical experience."
Our rules of evidence are the most striking examples of the common sense of the
common law.
As I began my address with a text, I
may properly close with an exhortation.
You, gentlemen of the graduating class of
Dickinson Law School, are about taking
your places in the ranks of the American
Bar. You assume grave responsibilities,
not only to your future clients, but to the
community as a whole. American lawyers, from the days of Jefferson, Madison,
Hamilton, Henry, Jay and Marshall to
the present time, have always been, and
still are, the leaders of thought in the field
of legislation, and in the domain of polities as well as in the administration and
development of jurisprudence proper.
It is to this leadership of the Bar that
we owe that healthy conservatism which
has hitherto restrained our people from
rash and radical changes, and from dangerous experiments in the science of government, or in rhe framework of our law.
We are about to enter on a new century.
The indications are that it-wll be a stormy
one. New situations will confront you of
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the coming generation. The forces of imperialism, plutocracy, populism and bossism are looming up before us, and threatening the permanency of our republican
form of government.
We find ourselves to-day engaged in an
armed conflict with a foreign nation. As
I write, the outcome is still uncertain, but
it seems impossible that there should be
any result except complete success for us
and defeat for Spain. Success will entail
upon us new obligations and new political
problems. Cuba will be under our protection, if not under our absolute sovereignty
as an integral part of our territorial domain. The Philippine Islands are already
on our hands for a shorter or longer period.
Not only so, but Hawaii is knocking at
our doors, or, at any rate, the ruling class
of Hawaii are knocking at our doors for
annexation.
The era of National expansion and the
era of imperialism seem to be upon us,
whether we like it or dislike it, whether
we approve or disapprove. For myself, 1
say frankly, I dislike and disapprove of it.
I fear the strain will be too great for the
simple machinery of our republican form
of government. Great armies and great
navies; pro-consular rulers of conquered
provinces; in the near future new States,
composed of heterogeious races of diverse
languages, and of all degrees of civilization
or uncivilization; are not these dangerous
to our domestic welfare?
Have we not had already trouble enough
with our Indians, with our negro slaves,
with our freedmen, with our Chinese immigrants? Have not the propositions that
"government rests upon the consent of
the governed," and that "all men are
created equal," been sufficiently travestied
in our past history by the necessities of our
race conflicts? Has not the Constitutional
Amendment, purporting to protect against
suffrage discriminations by the States on
account of "race, color or previous condition of servitude," been "more honored in
the breach than in the observance," and
have we not practically admitted that selfpreservation is the paramount law, and
that theoretical equality must yield to the
interests of civilization and social order?
Can we afford to take upon ourselves new
elements of incongruity in our body poliv4e? I candidly confess I dread the results

of the career of imperialism into which,
unless all signs fail, we are about to plunge.
I yield to no one in emotional and sentimental zeal for the honor of our flag and
the glory of our great Nation; but I am
most clearly of opinion that that honor
and that glory can be most surely and
safely maintained and increased by resisting the temptation to foreign expansion.
But, if it comes, the problems that come
with it must be met and faced as all our
previous problems have been met and
faced, in the spirit of practical common
sense, which has always characterized
Anglo-Saxon government and AngloSaxon jurisprudence.
As to plutocracy, I am strongly inclined
to believe that the danger from this source
is much overestimated. It is true that
there are to-day Immense aggregations of
capital under the control of a few individuals; that the existence of "trusts" is a
menace to the small dealer in the various
branches of industry, and that the Legislatures of our States are subjected to influences of a pecuniary nature from the officers
and directors of wealthy corporations.
Mly reflections on this subject, however,
have led me to the conclusion that the
natural laws of trade and of political economy will disintegrate these combinations
of capital, and will destroy their power for
evil.
It is none the less our duty to guard
against and to fight against their corrupting and tyrannizing tendencies.
By the term "populism," I do not mean
to refer to the political party calling itself
the "Populist" party; but I use it asa
convenient term to embrace all those fads
and fallacies which oppose themselves to
the common sense Anglo-Saxon theories
of government, and which set in motion
class antagonisms. It is not alittle singular that thus far "populism," so called,
has had its strongholds in the land-owning
class of the great West. Heretofore, the
land-owners have been the bulwark of conservatism. For the first time in our country's history this class has become the discontented, under the influence of real or
imaginary grievances.
In the future, however, populism will
become rampant among the laboring
classes, who will clamor more and more
against the existing order of society. We
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cannot blame them for feelings of discontent, but it behooves us to bestir ourselves
to prevent discontent from becoming revolutionary disorder.
There is undoubtedly much in the existing institutions of modern civilized society
which calls for readjustment, but violent
and radical changes in the social organism
cannot but produce evils greater than now
exist.
The duty of American lawyers is to
stand for true conservatism, while welcoming judicious reforms.
Herbert Spencer, in his work on Ethics,
undertakes to formulate a basis for morals
independent of religion, and he defines
morality as II the equilibrium between alThis cannot be
truism and egoism."
considered, even from the standpoint of
agnosticism, as a very happy solution of
the problem, or a very practical and workable formula.
We may, however, properly define the
function of the American Bar as the maintaining of the equilibrium between radicalism and obstructionism.
It is our function "to hold fast that
which is good," while notrefusing to look
forward to that which is better.
As to "bossism," there is no middle
ground. It must be exterminated, or our
republican institutions will become but a
hollow mockery. In the two great States
of New York and Pennsylvania the rule of
the political "boss" has developed into a
system, whose strength and persistent vitality have assumed alarming proportions.
It had its origin in party loyalty and
party bigotry. Fortunately, these are losing their hold upon intelligent voters.
It is for American lawyers to take the
lead in the regeneration of American politics.
The common sense of the American people must be appealed to. They must be
brought to see that party bosses are public
tyrants; that parties exist to carry into
effect principles of government, and notto
distribute offices among political henchmen; that temporary party defeat is better
than permanent party corruption; and
that the well-being of the Commonwealth
should be the paramount aim of all honest
partisans and of all patriotic voters.
The common sense of the common law
is its great glory. It is for you of the com-

ing generation of American lawyers to infuse the spitit of common sense into all
questions of public, affairs.
Thus and thus only will you succeed in
handing down unimpaired to your successors the priceless heritage of pure republican government.
Let us hope that we may realize the
words of the poet:
"Since heaven-espousing earthGave the Republic birth,
The goodliest gift our age bath
given, to be
Ours, while the sun givesglory
to the sea."

ADDRESS OF S. B. SADLER.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
We have been taught not only that law
is the perfection of reason, but that its
machinery and agencies are so complete
and well adjusted that, in its administration, the rights of all are assured and the
wrongs of all redressed. That the weakest
and the poorest are as confident of protection as the most powerful and richest.
That all have the assurance that evenhanded justice will be meted out, without
fear or favor. And that this has been the
pride and glory of. the jurisprudence of
England, on which that of America is
founded.
While in the main this may be accepted as true in the United States, yet in
certain respects it is lamentably otherwise;
and to such degrees as to merit and arouse
the concern of every citizen who has regard
for the welfare of the nation. To some of
these failures of our system ofjurisprudence
a brief reference is proposed.
The evolution of the law has been a natural process, originating with the first
family, whose bead at once enacted, proclaimed and executed it, and it has constantly developed with and adapted itself
to the necessities of our social system.
Among all the races which have lived
and flourished, not even excepting the
Romans, who gave the law to the world of
their day, none have equalled the AngloSaxon in their passion for making and executinglaws. When ourancestors emerged
from.the German forests they displayed a
judicial system, rude and barbaric, it is
true, but in which the equality of all
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before the law, and the inalienable rights of
life, liberty and property, were fully recognized. And wherever this enterprising
race ha§ penetrated it has established and
maintained the law based on its Teutonic
first principles.
Our American forefathers, aided by the
experience of their English ancestors, and
imbued with the same ideas of justice, incorporated these principles into the fundamental law of the land. They ordained
that no man should be deprived of life,
liberty or property without. due process of
law. That in all criminal prosecutions
the accused should be entitled to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury.
That he should be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusation against
him; that he should have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor;
that he should have the assistance of counsel in his defense; and that, if found guilty,
he should not be subjected to cruel or unusual punishments.
And though we have thisxecognition of
individual right and personal security under the laws, yet it cannot fail to be observed that in certain respects we have not
accomplished successfully the results
hoped for. This is possibly most strikingly
illustrated on the criminal side of our jurisprudence.
While in every State we have criminal
statutes and codes defining what crimes
are, and providing for their punishment,
and also declaring the procedure by which
offenders shall be tried and punished; yet
we also have an unwritten law unknown
to any other civilized land, and utterly at
variance with all these statutes and codes,
denominated lynch law. When it shall
be put in force, and to what cases it shall
apply, depending solely upon the passions
of an unreasoning mob.
Does it not seem strange that men are
done to death every day in this land where
the civil guarantees are so confidently proclaimed, without the semblance of a trial?
That, on the contrary, the mob usurping
the entire machinery of the law, should
arrest, prosecute, adjudge the guilt of and
execute the accused, entirely ignoring the
dictates of humanity or of the Constitution ?
For though this practice may at one
time have found some toleration in newly

settled districts or frontier towns, where a
rapid influx of population has preceded the
establishment of a civil government; or
where the assembling of a large number of
bold and hardened criminals has enabled
them to defy the legally-constituted authorities, and to commit crime at will,
unless suppressed by the order-loving portion of the community, yet, under conditions of well-settled government and society, it is without excuse, and cannot be
too strongly condemned.
While lynch law chnnot be said to prevail in the Northern atates of the Union,
and is almost universally deprecated, yet
it is sometimes resorted to, and the number of victims has been annually increasing. Rarely can the mobs of the South
boast the record of the civilized State of
Indiana in hanging five men in one evening for the robbing of one store.
That the problem is an exceedingly
grave one should be recognized when the
statistics show that within the past fifteen
years more than twenty-five hundred persons have thus had their lives taken by
mobs.
It surely is asignificant fact that we look
in vain for a similar state of affairs in
Great Britain or her colonies, whose people
are governed by laws substantially the
same as our own, and by a system certainly imbued with the same spirit, or, indeed, in any land which professes to have
a code of laws.
We may well ask, then, why our people
break the laws which they have made the
symbol of justice, and with their own
hands execute a punishment which the
officers designated by law can alone legally
inflict? The only reply made is that the
people are not satisfied that in certain
classes of crimes the punishment of the
guilty will be either reasonable or certain.
That the unlawful acts are the result of
disappointment in the past and a present
fear of a continued failure of justice. That
the men who visit quick and decisive punishment on the supposed murderer are for
the most part convinced that the interests
of society demand the sacrifice of all forms
of law to the achievement of substantial
justice. And though this reasoning is unsatisfactory to the thoughtful mind, yet
we find it acted upon daily despite the denunciations of pulpit, bench and bar.
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But whatever may be the defects in existing methods, whatever the difficulties
surrounding the problem, and however
urgent the necessity for reform, yet it is
certain that mob law and mob violence involve the greatest danger to the State.
No men or body of men can be allowed,
without great peril to the Commonwealth,
to supersede all civil authority, and arrogate to themselves the triple function of
judge, jury and executioner.
That resort to it is necessary would be a
confession of impotence, which wt as a
nation would be unwilling to make.
Nor do the laws with respect to property
administered through the civil tribunals
bring about in all respects that ideal result
which is satisfactory to the citizen, or even
protective of the rights which are guaranteed to him under the Constitutions of the
State and the United States. The subject
of combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, which are commonly
kfiown as trusts, have lately occupied a
prominent place in. the public mind, and
have received much attention from the
press, legislative bodies and judicial tribunals. And while ordinarily they disclaim
their offensive character, yet it. is a matter
of common knowledge, needing no demonstration, that trusts do exist and operate
to an extent -which affects every field of
trade and commerce. Their growth in this
country within the last decade has been
so marvellous, they have now assumed
such vast proportions, and their influences
have becomeso potent andgeneral throughout the land, that the man must be dull indeed who fails to discern their presence and
feel the force of their power. They have
multiplied until their name is legion, and
have increased in strength until they
affect every legitimate business and may
be felt by every family.
By their means large accumulations of
wealth are enabled to combine and crush
small individual enterprise, force the natural laws of trade and fix prices at will,
regardless of how it affects the country at
large. The ruin of thousands who have
endeavored to stand against these monopolies is a striking illustration of their effect.
The Legislatures seem devoid of ingenuity in passing enactments that will fetter their conduct, while courts are either
paralyzed or can invent no means of relief

for the multitude. Trusts can be routed
from the country, but honest, sensible and
drastic legislation and a fearless carrying
out of the same by the courts will be necessary to-accomplish it.
The magnitude of the undertaking, however, is well illustrated by a recent case in
which the integrity of the action of the
first legislative body of the land was questioned, and inquiry had been instituted.
Then there appeared to be no power to
draw testimony from the summoned witness of the offending trust, who, smiling
at a limited sentence for contempt, was
conveyed to a specially fitted cell in the jail
as-a hero, there transacted his ustal business
surrounded by secretaries and stenographers, and finally emerged from confinement covered with glory, while the nation
hung its head in shame.
The changed determination by which
the income tax was declared unconstitutional, and the granting of injunctions by
Federal courts in contentions between employer and employee, have also led to a
wide discussion as to the integrity of our
judicial system. Even the most reputable
newspapers have abounded in attacks
upon our courts and judges, and it is idle
to deny that the people at large are becoming distrustful.
Confidence once lost in the administration of justice, be it civil or criminal, is
not easily regained. When the body of
the people once lose faith in its Legislature
and its courts, then must each man depend as in primitive times on his own
strength to assert and defend his rights.
What, then, is it necessary for us to do?
We need by pen and tongue to acquaint
the people with the facts; to portray to
them the true condition and affairs; to
turn them long enough from the pursuit
of business success, to make them realize
the dangers which threaten. Our people.
do not understand that the world looks
with astonishment upon our failure to
punish crime according to law; that it is
about concluding that under a republican
form of government man's life may be dependent on the whim of a reckless mob;
that it gazes with wonder upon the increase of corporate power, by which not
only are Legislatures controlled, but suspicion is cast upon the conclusions of even
the highest judicial tribunals.
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Enkindle anew the sentiment of equality
of all before the law, and that all are entitled to protection in every right. Awaken
legislators to the necessity of enacting laws
which will restrain mob violence on the
one hand and corporate rapacity on the
other. Inspire the judiciary with the
spirit which led the English judges of
early times to defy even the power of the
sovereigns themselves in the rendition of
impartial determinations. Then and then
only will we remove the dangers which
menace the nation.

ALUMNI PERSONALS.
The FoRum rejoices in the fact that it is
able to record the presence of such a goodly
number of alumni at the seventh Commencement of the school. To the graduate,just launching upon a "sea of trouble,"
it is somewhat of an inspiration to look
upon the returning sons of the Dickinson
School of Law, who are meeting with so
much success. May the number increase
as the years go by.
Wm. D. Boyer, '92, and wife, spent
Commencement week very pleasantly in
Carlisle.
Neil C. MIcEwen, '93, brother of B.
Johnston McEwen, who at present attends the school, was with us for a few
days.
W. C. Allison, '92, and wife spent Commencement week here. Mr. Allison is the
grandson of agreat benefactor of the school
and we are glad to note that he has authorized the awarding of $2.5 yearly for excellence in some line of work to be determined
upon later.
J. Banks Kurtz, '93, was here several
days during Commencement week. Mr.
Kurtz, who practices in Altoona, has attained considerable prominence in the Republican party, and was spoken of for
District Attorney.
We also report the presence of the following alumni during Commencement:
George B. Somerville, '97, of the firm of
Griswold and Somerville, who gives a good
report of his work.

J. Wilmer Fisher, 196, who is meeting
with success in Reading.
Frank H. Fay, '96. Mr. Fay has removed his offices from Williamsburg to
Hollidaysburg, where he is now practicing.
Arthur C. Lackey, '95, and wife.
Samuel A. Lewis, '95, who is doing well
in Frederick, Md.
Francis J. Weakley, '95, practicing at
Reynoldsville.
Win. H. Walker, '96, practicing at Bellefonte.
J. H. Williams, '97, practicing at Wilkesbarre.
Rufus V. Lincoln, '96, practicing at Shamokin.
Grant W. Nitrauer, '95, practicing at
Lebanon.
Joseph F. Biddle, 297, practicing successfully at Bedford, Pa.
I. I. Wingert, '97, practicing at Chambersburg.
Jacob H. Reiff, '95, who took the degree
of A. Al. at College this Commencement.
Albert S. Heck, '92, lately made a good
run for Congress in his county.
A brother of Oscar C. Clark, '93, who
was here lately, reports that Oscar is doing well at Denton, Md.
P. Frank Loughran, '93, has removed his
offices from Hazleton to Scranton.
An excellent picture of John H.Williams
'97, who delivered the Memorial Day oration atWilkes-barre, appears in the Wilkesbarre Record. The Record says that it
was an able effort, and adds also that "iMr.
Williams is one of the most promising
young members of the Luzerne Bar."
Harvey S. Kiser, '97, after passing very
creditably, on June 6th, his examination,
was admitted to practice at the Bucks

County Bar.
The Reynoldsville Volunteer devotes
considerable space to remarks of "special
agent" W. H. Stamey, '96, on the Sugar
Beet Industry. Mr. Stamey has furnished
seed free to 600 farmers, accompanied with
instructions asto the culture of sugar beets.
We trust that his effbrts may meet with
great success.
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William F. Shean, '96. who has become
a prominent organizer of the Kn'ights of
Columbus, made several Decoration Day
speeches at Scranton.
R. J. Campbell, '96, and Willis R.
Mackey, '97, who attended the recent Re
publican Convention at Harrisburg, paid
a short visit to Carlisle.
We are glad to report that Harry W.
McDowell, '97, who is about to be admitted to practice in Denver, Col., is enjoying much better health.
J. C. Walker, '97, just enlisted as a. captain in U. S. Army, was highly praised by
Chief Justice Lore lately on his successful
defense in a murder trial.
It would give the editors of THE FoRumr
much pleasure to be able to print in full
the encouraging letters received, from time
to time, from the Alumni, but only a note
is possible. There are few instances of
such a close relation existing between the
Alumni and the active institution, and
nothing adds more to the success of our
school than this love for the Alma _1fater.
Among other things, Thos. K. Leidy,
'97, writes: "I am very well pleased with
the results of the course at Dickinpon, and
feel as if I had a good foundation."
In a letter from John E. Small, '97, we
learn that he is doing nicely in his practice at Shamokin.
**

*

Rush Trescott, '95, located at Wilkesbarre, sends his best wishes to the school.
A letter from Ray Zug, '96, who is in
business in Lowellville, Ohio, tells us that
he much enjoys his work there.
4_* *

We quote the following from a letter received from Robert A. Henderson, '94:
"You will find enclosed my check for
$1.25,subscription for THE FoRUM;" which
publication, he says, he is much pleased
with. Let us have more of these letters
which give financial as well as moral encouragement.
James F. Santee, '96, expresses in a note
lately received his interest in THE FORUmi.

Judge McComas, one oftheincorporators
of our school, received the degree of LL.
D. at Dickinson this Commencement.

SCHOOL NOTES.
P. E. Iladle, '98, has received authority
from the State to recruit a company for
the National Guard of the State. He recruited the company up to its quota in a
few days. M[any of the law students enrolled as members.
Francis Lafferty, '98, not content with
fitting himself to practice law, concluded
to also become a son-in-law. He was martied the week before Commencement, and
brought his bride back to school with him.
The boys made him explain how it happened.
F. B. Moser was called home to the bedside of his sick mother just before Commencemeilt, but arrived after her death.
Mr. Moser has the sympathy of the entire
college community in his bereavement.
The name of Dr. William Trickett, Dean
of the School, has been extensively mentioned as a good man for the Democrats to
nominate at the coming State Convention
for Superior Court Judge.
RESOLUTIONS OF RESPECT AND
SYMPATHY.
WHEREAS, Almighty God, in His wise
providence, has seen fit to visit the home
of our respected and beloved classmate,
and remove therefrom his kind and loving
mother; be it
Resolved, That the members of the class
of 1898 of the Dickinson School of Law
extend to Frederick B. Moser their sympathy as an expression of their sorrow for
himi in his bereavement. Be it further
Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be sent to Frederick B. Moser, and
also that they be published in the next
issue of THE FoRTr.

G. FRANK WETZEL,
J. HARVEY LINE,
FRANK MTORROW,
Committ~e.
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G. F. Vowinckle, '98, returned to school
for a few days from Camp Hastings, at
it. Gretna. He was accompanied by his
father.
The graduates who were admitted to the
Cumberland county bar are R. H. Barker,
A. J. Feight, Blake Irvin, H. E. Krupp,
Hugh R. Miller, F. B. Moser, A. G. Shoener, Adair Herman, Ralph H. Light, J.
Harvey Line, G. H. Moyer, S. B. Sadler,
P. J. Schmidt, W. K. Shissler, G. Frank
Wetzel, C. E. Daniels, P. E. Radle and
Robert Stucker.

MOOT COURT.
EMMA JENKINS vs. JOHN LEE.
Gift-Donatio Causa .fortis.
Trespass.
CLAUDE L. ROTH and J. THOMPSON
CALDWELL for the plaintiff.
All the essentials of a donatio causa mortis are present.-Blackstone's Com., Vol.
II, page 514; 8 Am. & Eng. Ency., 1341.
By the death of a donor the title of a gift
causa mortis vests as absolutely in the
donee as in the case of a gift inter vivos and
without its vesting in or passing through
the executor.-Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa.
177; Nicholas v. Adams, 2Wh. 122; Ward
v. Turner, 2. Ves. Sr. 448. Delivery to a
third person for the donee is effectual to
pass title.-Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. 62;
Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn. 366. The assent
of the executor is not necessary topass the
title.-Ward v. Turner, supra. Trespass
is the proper action t% try the validity of
the title.--Wells v. Tucker, supra; Mitchell v. Pease, 61 Mass. 350.
ALBERT T. MORGAN and WALTER G.
TREIBLY for defendant.
1. The law looks with disfavor upon gifts
caua mortis.-Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn.
366; Kent's Com., Vol. II, p. 444.
2. There was not a sufficient delivery.McGrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566; Bunn
v. Markham, 2 E. C. L. 336; Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. Jr's, 111.
3. There was no retention of possession.
--8 Am. & Eng. Ency. 1349; Craigv. Craig,
3 Barb. 76; Bunn v. Markham, supra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On February 26, 1898, at 6 A. M., Mary
Lee, a widow without issue, died. On
August 1, 1897, she executed a will and
made numerous bequests to friends and
relatives, and appointed John Lee her ex-

ecutor. On the night of February 5, 1898,
at about 10.30 o'clock, she was surrounded
at her bedside by numerous friends and
neighbors. namely, William McAndrews,
May McAndrews, his daughter, John Paul
and Mary, his wife, Samuel Jenkins and
Emma, his wife, and Dr. Ives, the attending physician.
Dr. Ives told her she was about to die
and asked her if there was anything she
would like to request. She answered, "I
have made a will but I would like to give
several presents to neighbors." She then
gave William McAndrews two pipes, May
McAndrews a diamond ring, Mary Paul
two silk dresses, and Emma Jenkins a diamond brooch. The doctor took this down
with pencil and requested William McAndrews to get the goods. William McAndrews does so and hands them to the
different donees. McAndrews takes away
his pipes and Mary Paul the dresses before
the death of Mary Lee. The others, after
holding their goods for a while lay them
aside in the room until after the death of
Mary Lee and then take them to their
homes. The executor, after death of Mary
Lee, issues a search warrant and takes the
goods from the donees. Emma Jenkins
sues in trespass for the value of the diamond
brooch.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The contest in this case is Aver the ownership of a diamond brooch. This brooch
had been the property of Mary Lee until
her death. It passed with her other personal property to' John Lee, her administrator, unless just before dying, she effectually gave it to Emma Jenkins. She had
already made a will, which may have been
broad enough in its terms to embrace the
brooch. But, as the will does not operate
until the death of the testator, the execution of it is no impediment to a disposition
otherwise of any of the property included
in it.
The will to give the brooch was clearly
expressed. "I would like to give several
presents to neighbors" said the dying
woman. She then enumerated the articles
which she intended to give, and named
their respective donees, who were present.
The physician wrote down the articles and
the beneficiaries, and in her hearing, and
with her assent, we must assume, directed
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Wm. McAndrews to get the articles. That
gentleman got them accordingly, and
handed them to the respective donees. In
these facts, we find the elements of a donatio mortis causa. There was not the intention to give in the future, but the intention
to give instantly. The articles were produced and they were by her agent handed
to and received by their donees. There was
then a complete execution of the intention
to give. The dying woman did not with
her own hand pass the brooch to the plaintiff. But she named it, and it was brought
out in her presence. In Wells v. Tucker,
3 Binn. 366, the expiring man told his wife
where the thing he intended to give was,
and asked her to go and get it. She got it
and locked it in her trunk, and delivered
it after his death to the designated person.
The gift was valid. In Mary Lee's presence the brooch was handed by Mr. MicAndrews to Emma Jenkins. A delivery
to a third person for the use of a donee who
is not present is good. In Michener v.
Dale, 23 Pa. 59, a bag of gold dust was, at
the request of a dying man on board ship
in the Pacific taken by a sailor to the purser,
who was requested to deliver it to his
brother and sister in Philadelphia. Thousands of miles separated the donor from the
donee, and months elapsed after the death
of the former before the latter received the
gold. The gift was nevertheless valid.
In Wells v. Tucker, supra, the gift was
made to an absent person. Cf. Walsh's
Appeal, 122 Pa. 177. Here the delivery is
by the hand of a third person directly to
the donee.
It is hardly important to determine
whether the gift is an ordinary one, or a
gift mortis causa. A sick man may give
his chattels away as fully as a well man.
That in a very short interval of time death
supervenes cannot impair the gift. Were
it important to so decide, the material is
present in abundance to support the determination that the gift to Emma Jenkins
was mortis causa. Such gifts can take
place when of choses in action, Gourley v.
Lensenbigler, 51 Pa- 34.5; Wells v. Tucker,
3 Binn. 370; of gold watches, Nicholas v.
Adams, 2 Wh. 17; of a bag of gold dust,
Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. 59, or of any other
chattel. That the gift of Mary Lee was
made in view of death may be inferred,
Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Wh. 22; Rhodes v.

Childs, 64 Pa. 345. She had just been told
that she was about to die, and asked to
make any requests she had to make.
Thereupon followed the gift. The inference is irresistible that gift was made on
the condition that she died of the sickness.
As she did die, we do not have to concern
ourselves with the problem what would
have resulted had she recovered.
It was suggested that the failure of Emma Jenkinsto take away the brooch until
after the death of Mrs. Lee repels the hypothesis of an executed gift. She took the
brooch from Mr. McAndrews, and retained
it in her possession for a while, probably in
her hand. She then laid it aside in the
room until the expected death had occurred
and then took it to her home. It does not
appear that she left the room until after
the death. It cannot matter. What had
happened was sufficient to pass the conditional ownership to her. That ownershili
surely could not be destroyed by laying the
brooch aside and calling for it after the
death. There was no change of the will of
the donor, no revocation of the gift.
The brooch then, having been given to
Miss Jenkins, though only mortis causa,
did not become the property of the administrator of the donor, at her death.-Michener v. Dalb, 23 Pa. 59, and the plaintiff is
entitled to recover damages for the conversion of it in this action of trespass.
ESTATE OF URIAH D. OSMAN,
DEC'D.
Letters of adniinistration- Widow's right
to administer- Wid w's exemption.
Appeal from register.
MERKEL

LANDIS

and

WALTER

J.

HENRY for appellants.
As to the granting of letters of administration, see P. & L. Dig., p. 1465. A wife's
absence from her husband's domicil,
through no fault on her part, for some time
previous to his death, does not bar her
from claimingthe $300 exemption.-Simpson's Est., 22 W. N. 0. 172; Terry's Appeal, 55 Pa. 344; Coates' Est., 6 W. N. C.
367; Moore's Appeal, 3 Penny. 110.
Other cases cited : Gordon v. Gordon, 48
Pa. 288; Jones v. Jones, 66 Pa. 494; Dietrick's Appeal, 117 Pa. 452; Bander's Appeal, 115 Pa. 480; Act of June 20, 1893.
CLARENCE R. GILLILAND and WALTER
B. FREED for appellees.
The right to administer is lost by desertion.-Odiorne's Appeal, 54 Pa. 175; Act
of April 14, 1851, B. P. Dig. 416.
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A wife who lives away from her hus-

band is not entitled to the $300 exemption.
-Odiorne's Appeal, supra; Spier's Ap.,
26 Pa. 233; Hettrick v. Hettrick, 55 Pa.
292; John Kelly's Est., I W. N. C. 10;
Coates' Est., 6 W. N. 0. 367; Nye's Appeal, 126 Pa. 341.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mr. Uriah D. Osman and Mrs. Carrie
E. Wolfe were married some time in the
year 1885. They both had been married
before, and had children from the respective husband and wife. After they were
married Mrs. Wolfe, now Mrs. Osman,
went and lived with her husband, Mr.
Osman, on his farm. Theygot along very
well for ten or twelve years, and after that
they began fighting. The treatment received was so bad that she had to leave
him. He made all sorts of threats, said
that he would get her out of the way, and
that he would not have her around him.
After this treatment she did not. deeni it
safe for her to remain, and left him Jan.
11, 1897. Some time after she left, i. e.,
October, 1897, she was asked by him, and
also by other persons for him, whether or
not she would come back and live with
him. She refused for the same reason
above stated, to wit: that she did not think
that she would be safe in his presence.
Mr. Osman dying December 20, 1897, left
personal property to the value of $1,000 or
$1,500, and realty to the value of about
$8,000. The son of Mr. Osman notified the
register not to grant letters to the widow,
and the widow immediately gave thesame
kind of a notice as to the son and heirs.
This case stated is framed to obtain the
decision of the orphans' court as to
whether the widow is entitled to letters of
administration, and to the $300 exemption.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The right to administration is conferred
by statute. The twenty-second se&-on of
the act of March 15, 1832, 1 P. & L. 1464,
enacts that " whenever letters of administration are by law necessary, the register
having jurisdiction shall grant in such
form as the case shall require, to the
widow, if any, of the decedent, or to such
of his relations or kindred as by law may
be entitled to the residue of his personal
estate." The widow is the woman who,
being his wife at the time of his death,

survives the decedent. Mrs. Carrie E.
Osman being in this sense the widow, is
prima facie entitled to the letters of administration.-Wilkey's Appeal, 108 Pa.
567.
She was, however, not living with her
husband at the time of his death. She
left him Jan. 11, 1897, and continued to
live apart from him until his death, on
Dec. 20, 1897, nearly one year. An unexcused desertion, even for but two months
before his death, would destroy her right
to administer.-Odiorne's Appeal, 54 Pa.
175. A desertion is primafacie malicious,
and the justificatory facts, if such there be,
must be shown.-Hahn v. Bealor, 132 Pa.
242.
There may be excuses for living elsewhere than with the husband, which will
preserve the right to administer to the
widow. The husband's consent to the
separation-Ross' Estate, 11 Pa. C. C. 601;
acts of the husband making the separation
reasonably necessary, followed by a divorce at the instance of the wife, a mensa
et thoro Fyock's Estate, 135 Pa. 522, and
acts of the husband making the separation
reasonably necessary, although there has
been no adjudication on their sufficiency,
will produce this result.-Moore's Appeal,
3 Penny. 110; Simpson's Est., 22 W. N. C.
172; Coates' Est., 6 W. N. . 367.
The case stated is quite unsatisfactory as
to the causes of the separation of Mrs. Osman. "The treatment received was so
bad that she had to leave him. He made
all sorts of threats; said that he would get
her out of the way, and that he would not
have her around him." The threats to
"get her out of the way" must be und6rstood to be threats to kill her. Threats to
kill are an indignity to the person, that
may render one's condition intolerable and
life burdensome. "To put her," says Williams, Justice, "in mortal terror by repeated threats to kill is as truly destructive
to health as to administer poison. It may
not be as speedy, but, if continued, it is
certain destruction to both mind and body.
It banishes peace and comfort from her
home, and puts fear, a sense of constant
peril, and a blighted domestic life in their
place."-Mason v. Mason, 131 Pa. 161.
The reasonable apprehension of violence
from the husband's threats will justify
separation from him, as much as when it
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is founded on already attempted violence.
-- Deitrick's Appeal, 117 Pa. 452; Jones V.
Jones, 66 Pa. 494; Hardie v. Hardie, 162
Pa. 227. A single threat, which awakens
no alari, from the wife to the husband

would not have this result.-Hahn v.
Bealor, 132 Pa. 242. The parties having
agreed in the case stated that the bad
treatment, including threats to kill, of -Mr.
Osman was such that she "had" to leave
him, it follows that, in leaving him, she
did not forfeit the right to administer on
his estate. The court must decide whether
the facts cited to justify desertion of the
husband are in fact sufficient.-Nye's Appeal, 126 Pa. 341.
The other question presented by the case
is, whether the separation of Mrs. Osman
from her husband has deprived her of the
right to the $300 allowed the widow. We
have already determined that she is entitled to administer. But, it seems that a
widow may have the latter right, although
she has lost the former.-Kelley's Estate,
1 W. N. C. 10; Coates' Estate, 6 W. N. C.
367; Ross' Estate, 11 Pa. C. C. 601. Living apart after a decree of divorce, a mensa
el thoro, does not destroy the right of a
widow to administer on her husband's
estate-Fyock's Estate, 135 Pa. 522; but
apparently does destroy the right to the
$300.--ettrick v. Hlettrick, 55 Pa. 290.
Unjustifiable separation from the husband
destroys her right to the $300.--Platt's
Appeal, 80 Pa. 501; Kahn's Estate, 16 Pa.
C. C. 72; Nye's Appeal, 126 Pa. 341; Martin's Estate, 5 Pa. C. C. 504; Kelley's Estate, 1W. N. C. 10. As we haveconcluded
that Mrs. Osman's separation under the
circumstances was not reprehensible, we
think she is entitled to the $300.-Simpson's Estate, 22 W. N. C. 172; Terry's Appeal, 55 Pa. 344.
MRS. ELIZA McCORMICK vs. G.
HENRY BROWN.
Set-off-Married women as makers of
notes-Cannot be accommodation cndorser-Aet of 1893-lMarriedwomen.
Assumpsit.
EDWIN G. HUTCHINsoN and FRED. B.
Mosiint for the plaintiff.
I. A married woman may not become
surety for another.-Act of June 8, 1893, P.
L. 344; Witbank v. flobler, 181 Pa. 103;
Harley v, Leonard, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431;

Moyer v. Capp, 3 Dist. Rep. 392; Kuhn v.
Ogilvie, 178 Pa. 303; Patrick v. Smith, 165
Pa. 526.
2. A married woman's endorsement of a
promissory note without consideration is
regarded as an ordinary suretyship and
comes under the act.-Wright v. Bigley, 5
Sup. Ct. Rep. 503; Real Est. Inv. Co. v.
Roop, 132 Pa. 496; Patrick v. Smith, 165
Pa. 526.
3. A judgment confessed by a married
woman to secure the indebtedness of her
husband is void.-M2%ingle v. Murray, 6 Pa.
C. C. 81; Lutchen v. Paris, 19 Phila. 374;
Baker v. Singer Mfg. Co., 122 Pa. 863; McCowan V. Heiser, 4 C. C. 609.
WILLIAm A. JORDAN and MrARTiN F.
DUFFY for the defendant.

A judgment given by a married woman
is no longer pIbna facie void, but presumably valid -Harrar v. Croney, 32 V. N.
C. 90. Her inability is the exception rather
than the rule.-Koechling v. Henkel, 144
Pa. 215; B. & L. Ass'n v. Fritz, 152 Pa.
224; Spotts' Estate, 156 Pa. 281; Jester v.
Hunter, 2 Dist. Rep. 690. The fact that
the husband and wife signed a judgment
note does not raise the presumption that
the wifesigned as surety.-Stephen v. Hendock, 4 Pa. Sup. Ct. 474. A married woman may mortgage her estate to secure her
husband's debt.-Kuhn v. Ogil vie, 178 Pa.
303; Kulp v. Brant, 112 Pa. 222. A note
given for her husband's debt is valid.-Harrar v. Croney, 32 W. N. C. 90; Stephen v.
Hudoek, 4 Sup. Ct. 474. Judgments confessed by a married womn are valid under
lite acts. -Abell v. Chaffee, 154 Pa. 254;
Adams v. Gray, 154 Pa. 238; McNeal v.
NeNeal, 161 Pa. 109; McCormick v. Buttorf, 155 Pa. 331.
OPINION OF TIE COURT.

In 1895 Walter McCormick gave John
Ash his note for$i5, and shortly afterward
made an assignment to Asi for the benefit
of his creditors. The personal property
sold by Ash as assignee was bought by the
plaintiff, the wife of the assignor. The
real estate was sold on executions on liens
earlier than the assignment, and its proceeds were insufficient to pay them. The
proceeds of the personal property have
been insufficient to pay the costs of administration, of which $35 are unpaid. Early
in 1896 Ash induced Walter McCormick
and his wife to give him a judgment note
for $50, embracing the debt due Ash of $15
and the $35. Later, ii March, 1896, Eliza
McCormick sold all her personal property
and Brown bought a horse for $47.50 and
was permitted to take it away on condition
that he would return the next day and pay
for it or give his note, Rfe Ilas never paid
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nor given his note.

fL this suit for the

price of the horse, Ileattenipts to set oft*the
note given by the MeCormicks to Ash,

which he acquired before the institution of
the action.
Several objections might be made to tihe
set-off of the McCormick note by Brown.
(a) That note so far as Mrs. McCormick
was concerned ws without consideration.
The debts for which it was given were existing debts of the husband. No forbearance was stipulated for. The consideration,
even as to Walter McCormick, was past.
As to Mrs. McCormick, the past credits
given to her husband could be no valid
consideration.-Clark, Contracts, 197. Tie
note was not under seal.
(b) Another objection to the note, as a
set-off, is that Mrs. McCormick was legally
incomlpetent to bind herself by it. At comnnmon law, such a note would have been
void. If valid now its validity is the result
of legislation. The second section of the
act of June 8, 1893, 2 P. & L. 2-90, enacts
that "hereafter a married woman may, in
the-same manner and to the same extent
as an unmarried person make any contract
in writing or otherwise, which is necessary,
apl)prol)riate, convenient or advantageous to
the exercise or enjoyment of the rights and
poweis granted by the foregoing section,
]10conie a(econllnodawhich she mlotf
tion endorser, mnaker, gulrantor or surety
The facts show beyond
for another."
question that Mrs. McCormick is, as
co-nmkerof tile note in the hands of Brown
but at surety. She is therefore not responsible.-Wiltbank v. Tobler, 4 Superior, 103;
Harley v. Leon. rd, 181 Pa. 431; Patrick v.
Smith, 165 Pa. 526; Weigle v. Mercer, 1
Superior, 490.
(e) The sale of the horse by M1i's. McCor-

mnick to Brown was upon the condition
that its priceshould be paid in cash, or that
a note should be given for it. If when
Brown received the horse from the vendor,
he had tendered the Ash note, she could
have declined to take it, and could have
refused to deliver the horse, and if without
her consent Brown had got possession of
the horse, she could have recovered it by
replevin.-Bush v. Bender, 113 Pa. 94.
Thisaction is not a rel)levin, but assumlpsit
to comipel the paynmnt of the money. As
the parties contemplated a cash sale unless
it note was given, and as the note has not

been given, the plaintiff is now entitled to
the same foirm of payment that she would
have been entitled to had payment been
made at thle proper time. Tiie right of set
oil has been waived by time defendant.--(.f.
Sheariian v. Morrison, 149 Pa. 386; Tagg
v. Bownian, 99 Pa. 376; 103 Pa. 273; Bank
of U. S. v. Macalester, 9 Pa. 475; Ardesco
Oil Co. v. N. A. Mining and Oil Co., 66
Pa. 375; Smuller v. Union Canal Co., 37
Pa. 68. Tile promise of Brown was made
under circumstances that justified Mrs.
McCormick to expect money. You will
therefore, gentlemen of the jury, render a
verdict for the price of the horse with interest.
HENRY GILMAN vs. HOMER WESTON.
J'rornissorgnote-Ridorseefor value-Hot
aftecled 4y a dfem.se available against
1a.11cc-PresunIIgionm.
Assumpsit.
CHAS. MCMEANS and CIAS. E. HORN

for plaintiff.
1. An endorsee who takes a negotiable
note in payment of tpre-existing debt, in
ignorance of any defenses which might
stand against the payee, is t bona fide
holder for value. He is not subject to
equities against the payee. Rosenlherger
v. Bitting, 15 Pa. 278; Bardsley v. Delp,
88 Pa. 420; Snyder v. 1'lliott, 2 Penny.
474; Gatzmier v. Pierce, 6 W. N. C. 433;
Jareeki Mfg. Co.v. Haynmaker 138 Pa., 641;
Swift v. T;son, 41 U. S. 1: R. R. Co. v. Nat.
Bk., 102 U. S. 14. The presumption is
that note was obtained in regular course
of business aind before maturity. Hey v.
Frazier, I Miona. 759; Lamb v. Burke, 132
Pa. 423.
2. Ain unliquidated demand cannot be
set off against t note; Byle on Bills, 367.
ISAIAI- SCilErINE 'Ind JOHN G. MIJl

LER for defendant.
Presumption that it was negotiated after
maturity. Snyder v. Riley, 6 Pa. 165. An
indorser, after matturity, takes the same
interest that the indorser had, and his
clain is sub*ject to time same defense.
Marsh v. Marshall, 53 Pa. 396; Clay v.
Cottrell, 18 Pa. 408; Bacon v. Scott, 154
Pa. 2.50; Long v. Rhawn, 75 Pa. 128;
Young v. Shriner, 80 Pa. 463; Bank v.
Barrien, 1 Yeates 3610; Hughes v. Large, 2
Pa. 103; Bank v. Woodward, 18 Pa. 357;
Folsomn v. Bartlett, 2 Cal. 163; Wheeler v.
Barret, 20 Mo. 573; Farris v. Catlett, 32
Mo. 4(9; Leavitt v. Putna. 3 N. Y. 494.
Breach of warranty is a defense pro tanto
to the note. Gray v. Bowden, 40 Mass.
282; Daggett v. Daggett, 62 'Mass. 520;
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Brown v. Weldon, 99 Mo. 568; Van Ostrand
v. Reed, 1 Wendell 424.
STATEIMENT OF THE CASE.
On July 6,1894, Weston bought of Staniey Johnson 400 barrels of flour, with a
warranty thatit was equal tothe best quality sold in the Philndelphia market, and
gave to Johnson, in paynient, a promissory
note for $1,500, payable to Johnson's order
oi October 6th, ]894. The flour turned
out to be ofinferior quality, worth 50 cents
per barrel less than that stipulated for.
Johnson being indebted to Gilman in the
sun of $2,000 transferred the note by endorsenent to Gilman in 1ayment Pro
tanto of the debt. Gilan sues Weston on
the note in the month of February, 1898.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

If this suit were by Johnson, Weston
would have a right to deduct from it his
damages arising front the breach of the
warranty. These damages are measured
by the difference between the market value
of the chattel, in its actual state, and what
would have been its market value, had it
been what it was warranted to be. Hinies
v. Kiehl, 154 Pa. 190; Ogden v. Beatty, 137
Pa. 197. But the suit is not by Johnson
but by his endorsee.
The endorsee takes a negotiable note free
from defenses arising from fraud on the
maker or want or failure of consideration,
unless lie is not a holder for value, or inless lie knew of the fraud or of the want or
failures of consideration when he accepted
the endorsement, or unless he became the
endorsee after the note had become due.
It does not appear when Gilman bought
the note, whether before or after its maturity. It is presumed, however, that he
bought it before its maturity, that lie had
no knowledge of any defects that impair
it, and that he gave a consideration for it.
Hill v. Kroft. 29 Pa. 186; Lerch Hardware
Co. v. First National Bank of Columbia,
109 Pa. 240; Investment Co. v. Russel, 148
Pa. 496; Snyder v. Riley, 6 Pa. 164; Gray
v. Bank of Kentucky, 29 Pa. 264; 4 Am.
and Eng. Encyc. 318; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst.
712, 786, 812.
This presumption is overcome when the
defendant shows that a fraud was practiced on him. It is not overcome by proof
of a failure or a want of consideration.
Hill v. Kroft, 20 Pa. 264; Lerch Hardware

Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 109 Pa. 240; Sloan
v. Union Bank Co., 67 Pa. 470; Albrecht
v. Strimpler, 7 Pa. 476; Dingman v. Amsink, 77 Pa. 114; 4 Am. and Eng. Encyc.
325.
Proof of breach of warranty of a
chattel does not overcome it. Holden v.
Phoenix Rattan Co., 168Mass.570; Snyder
v. Riley, 6 Pa. 164.
It distinctly appears that Gilman paid
for the note, a part of a pre-existing debt.
If such payment does not make him a
purchaser of the note for value, he is exposed to the defense which is urged by
Weston. Nothing is better settled, however, than that when the endorsement is
in consideration of the extinction of a preexisting debt, the endorsee is a purchaser
for value.---Bardsley v. Delp, 88 Pa. 420;
Snyder v. Elliott, 2 Penny. 475; Struthers
v. Kendall, 41 Pa. 214; 4 Am. & Eng. Eneye. 285.
But, did lie buy the note without notice
of the maker's defense? Did he buy it
after its maturity? The presumption that
an endorsee acquired the note before its
maturity, and without notice, is, says Gibson, C. J., "not only of the slightest kind,
but open to be blown away by the slightest breath of suspicion."- Snyder v. Riley,
6 Pa. 108, quoted in Hill v. Kroft, 29 Pa.
186. Circumstances mentioned in these
cases, as sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the endorsee, are the
failure to demand payment of the maker
at maturity; to give notice of non-payment
to the endorser, and to sue for a long time
after the time for payment has arrived.Of. Smith v. Ewer, 22 Pa. 116; Duerson v.
Alsop, 27 Grat. 249; 4 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
324; 1 Daniel, Negot. Inst. In Tams v.
Way, 13 Pa. 222, it is said that a delay to
sue for six years less two days raises "a
violent presumption that it [the note] was
not endorsed in due course of commercial
business." The Weston note became payable on October 6, 1894. We know nothing of the possession of it other than that
it was bought some time for a part of a
debt; and that an action has been brought
upon it in February, 1898. We are of
opinion that this long period, coupled
with the failure of consideration, would
have imposed on Gilman the duty of showing where he acquired the note. But there
has been only a partial failure of consideration. And there is express evidence of ,
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payment of a substantial consideration by

the farm in accordance with the above contract, paying the rent punctually when
due, the value of the farm had increased
from $8,000 to $10,000 by reason of the
opening of a railroad and the establishment of a village in its neighborhood.
Platon thereupon renounced the above
contract, declaring to Gaines that he would
not regard himself as bound by the contract to convey, and also insisted on Gaines
vacating the farm, threatening to bring an
action of ejectment against him if he did
not.
Gaines, fearing that he might be ejected,
accepted the deed from Platon and paid
him $8,000 at once for the farm, protesting,
however, that his only reason for so doing
JOHN GAINES vs. ADAM PLATON.
was the compulsion that he was under
Consideration-Executed contract- Du- and that he would resort to whatever remress.
edy he found available to recover the excess beyond $5,000 for which this action
Assumpsit.
was brought.
ISAIAH SCHEELINE and E. SAULSBURY,
There is no ground, we think, for holdattorneys for plaintiff cited that
The evidence does not show whether or
ing as the plaintiffs did in the argument,
not Platon believed he had a right to eject
that there is no consideration for the
Gaines. If he did so believe, relief should
amount
in excess of $5,00, for by entering
be granted, because the contract was made
into the second contr'act the first was
under a mutual mistake of law.-Am. and
Eng. Encyc. Law, Vol. 15, p. 642;° Green
clearly rescinded. - Brownfield's Ex. v.
v. Morris, etc., R. R. Co., 12 N. J. Eq. 164;
Brownfield, 151 Pa. 565; Groves v. DonJacobs v. Morange, 47 N. Y. 57; Champaldson, 15 Pa. 128; which cases hold that
lin v. Layton, 12 N. Y. Ct. 466.
a contract may be rescinded by such acts
If Platon did not so believe, then there
must be a presumption of undue influence
of the parties as clearly show an intention
or imposition. - 1 Story Eq. Jur. 121;
to rescind. In Rollins v. Marsh, 128 Mass.
Rankin v. Mortimere, 7 Watts. 325.
116,
we find that if two enter into a conDANIEL R. REESE and A. F. JOHN,
tract, which one refuses to fulfill and the
attorneys for defendant, cited that
otber makes a new contract with him
The statement made by the defendant
to plaintiff to induce the sale does not
which operates as a rescission of the origamount to duress.-Miller v. Miller, 68 Pa. inal contract, the new contract is founded
486; Natcher v. Natcher, 47 Pa. 498; Ranupon a sufficient consideration. The rekin v. Mortimere, 7 Watts. 372; Real Est.
lease of one from the stipulations of the
Say. Trust v. Linden, 74 Pa. 371; Am. and
Eng. Encyc. Law, Vol. 6, p. 65; Wharton,
original agreement is the consideration for
Conts., See. 198.
the release of the other, and the mutual
That the former contract was rescinded
by the making of the latter, and as the releases are the consideration for the new
plaintiff agreed to and did pay under the
contract and are sufficient to give it full
latter he cannot recover the difference.legal effect.-Cutter v. Cochranv, 116 Mass.
Sillman v. U. S., 101 U. S. 465; Rollins v.
408.
Marsh, 128 Mass. 116; Brownfield's Exec.
The plaintiff acquires no additiowal adv. Brownfield, 151 Pa. 565; Wharton,
vantages from the second contract, but
Conts., See. 150.
Before Moser, P. J., and Haas, J.
claims that the defendant is benefited by
OPINION OF THE COURT.
all he receives in excess of $5000, which,
Moser, P. J.:-Platon contracted with
assuming that $300 per year is a fair rental
for the farm, would be $3000 and the interGaines to lease a farm to him for $300 per
year for a period of 10 years, at the end of est on $8000 for three years; the plaintiff
which time he was to convey the farm to
holds that these benefits were obtained by
legal duress or mistake and brings this acGaines for $5,000. After thelapse of 7 years,
tion for the recovery of the same.
during which time Gaines had occupied
the plaintiff. Whatever the cause of the
1Mng delay in suing, it was not because of
a consciousness that a recovery for a considerable amount was unlikely. In this
respect this case differs from 6 Pa. 108; 29
Pa. 186; 13 Pa. 222. We do not think that
the delay is sufficient to repel the presumption that the note was taken in due
course. A full consideration was paid for
it.
It is hardly likely that this would
have been paid had the note been bought
after its maturity. We think the case has
been rightly tried, and that the verdict for
the plaintiff must stand. Motion for a
new trial overruled.
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Had the plaintiff stood upon his contract
rights, it is perfectly clear that he eould not
have been ejected and that he could have
enforced the original contract, but when
he yielded to the demand of the defendant
simply because he threatened ejectment,
and executed a new contract, a substitute
for the old, he forfeited his rights on the
original contract.-United States v. Silliman, 101 U. S. 465; Grobel and Gorenflo v.
Linn and Linn, 47 Mich. 489.
If by the second contract the plaintiff is
precluded from any redress oil the original
contract, the oitly ground for complaint
left is that he was forced into the second
contract, notwithstanding his protests, in
order to avoid an ejectmeut suit which was
threatened by the defendant, but which he
in fact could not maintain.
The statement of fact says that, '"Gaines
knev little of the law and had a vague apprehension that lie might be ejected." We
think his ignorance here is very unfortunate and will in nowise aid him in recovering for in Hunt v. Moore, 2 Pa. 105,
it is held that ignorance or mistake in law
may afford some influence of imposition,
though in itselfit cannot be relieved against
Ignorance of the law does not affect contracts, nor excuse a party from the legal
consequences of particular acts.-Rankin
v. M\ortiiere, 7 Watts 372; McAninch v.
Labghlin, 13 Pa. 371; Gross v. Leber, 47
Pa. 520.
The threatened eiectroent would not
amount to such duress as to avoid a promise induced thereby.-Dunham v. Griswold, 100 N. Y. 224; 1Whar. on Contracts,
see. 150 and cases cited.
A threat to refuse performance of a conitract, or to do any injury whicli may at
once be redressed by legal process is not
duress per mina..-IMiller v. Miller, 68 Pa.
486; 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 70.
Paymentof money upon an illegal and
unjust demand, when the party is advised
of all the facts, can only be considered involuntary when it is made to procure the
release of the person or property of the
party from detentibn, or when the other
party is armed with apparent authority to
seize upon either, and the payment is made
to prevent it.--%Volfe v. Marshall, 52 M£o.
167; Colwell v. Peden, 3 Watts 327; Lackey
v. Mercer County, 9 Pa. 318. A voluntary
payment of money without fraud or con-

straint, though~in ignorance of the law or
the legal circumstances of the case, cannot
be recovered back.-Natchct v. Natchet,
47 Pa. 496; Funnel v. Brew, 81 Pa, 362.
One who voluntarily pays money with
knowledge or means of knowledge of the
facts, and without fraud on him, cannot
recover it because he paid in ignorance of
the law.-Real Est. Say. Inst. v. Linder,
74 Pa. 371; Irvine v. Hanlin, 10 S. & R.
21.); Espy v. Allison, 9 Watts 462; Boas v.
Updegrove, 5 Pa. 516; Appeals of During,
King & Miller, 13 Pa. 224; Natchet v.
Natchet, 47 Pa. 496; Deysher v. Weibel,
64 Pa. 383.
According to the doctrine laid down in
Rankin v. Mortimere, 7 Watts 372, and
Jordan v. Stevens, 51 Me. 78, cases upon
which the counsel for the plaintiff seems
to put considerable stress, the plaintiff, we
think, would have some standing if he
could show "a marked disparity in the
position and intelligence of the parties, so
that they were not on equal terms or undue influence on one side and undue confidence on the other." Judge Rodgers
says in the former case, quoting Story on
Eq. Jur., " when there is gross ignorance,
or a plain and palpable mistake of a plain
and familiar principle of law, it may well
give rise to presumption that there has
been undue influence, imposition, mental
imbecility, surprise, -orthat the confidence
of the party has been abused." We can
see nothing in the statement of facts to indicate that Gaines was taken at a disadvantage in this respect, nor do we see any
good reason for making such a presumption as above, for we think it was not so
much a mistake of law on the part of
Gaines as ignorance of law, for which, according to cases cited, we are of the opinion
he has no redress, and cannot recover in
this action.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

Gaines, when threatened by Platon with
an ejectment, could not have been dispossessed. He had a right to the possession,
(a) because his lease had yet three years to
run and (b) because conjoined with the
lease was a contract of sale, under which
Gaines, put in possession, had a right to
continue indefinitely therein, on the payment of the $5,000, the purchase monqy.
Phitony§ threat was not to violently expel
Gaines from the land, but simply to sue
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him in ejectment. To have defended the
ejectment would have been as simple a
mode of contesting Platon's right to require
more than $5,000, as, paying the additional $3,000, to resort to this assumpsit in
order to recover it back.
The threat of a civil action whereby no
disturbance of the possessory or proprietary
right of the person threatened can be effected,.except by the judgment of the court,
is not duress.-Clark, Cont. 361; Hilborn v.
Bucknam, 7 Atlan. 272 (Mle.); De La Cuesta
v. Ins. Co., 136 Pa. 62; Peebles v. Pittsburg,
101 Pa. 304. The fact that-Gaines was apprehensive that the decision in such suit
would be adverse to him shows simply that
he was mistaken as to the law, and that
what he paid, he paid under the influence
of that mistake. It is needless to cite authorities to prove that for the consequences
of such mistake there is no remedy.
If we regard the ejectrnent as a means to
dispossess Gaines, and assume that he paid
to avoid this dispossession which he
thought would surely follow, his payment
would be voluntary.-Heysham v. Dettre,
89 Pa. 506.
But, it is said, whether Gaines paid under
duress or not, there was no consideration
for the payment. He was already entitled
to the conveyance and for $5,000. He paid
then $3,000 for nothing. If Platon was
honest in thinking that he could eject
Gaines, the payment may be regarded as
a compromise of a doubtful right. Let us
suppose, however, that the facts necessary
to sustain the transaction as a compromise
do not exist, and that the $3,000 were in
fact paid without consideration. What
follows? The want of consideration vitiates
only an executory contract. For an executed conveyance of money, chattels or
land, it is unnecessary. A payment, reluctantly made, to avoid the deprivation of a
right to stocks or other property, is, even
if accompanied, by a protest, a payment
made voluntarily and cannot be recovered
back.-De La Cuesta v. Ins. Co., 136 Pa.
62. It is the duty of a person on whom an
illegal demand is made, as the condition of
according to him what is already his due,
to appeal to the courts to vindicate this
right. If he buys respect for it, by a price,
the courts will not help him to recover the
money paid. Thejudgmentof the learned
court below must therefore be affirmed.

SAMUEL PARKER vs. ISRAEL JESSUP AND THOMAS JESSUIP.
Parol guarantee of the quantity of lawl
sold - Agency- Ratification- Ancndment.
A4ssuMpsit.
CLARENCE R.

GILrrANi)

and JohiN C.

D. DAvis for the plaintiff.
1. The statement of Israel Jessup
amounted to a warranty. - Wilmot v.
Hurd, 11 Wend. 586; Andrews v. Kneeland 6 Cowen 354; Brooks v. It. R. Co.,
108 a. 529; Grinwald v. Gebbie, 126 Pa.
353; Am. and Eng. Encyc., Vol. 28, pp.
763, 769; Oneieda Mfg. Society v. Lawrence, 4 Cowen 440.
2. The fact that the farm was to contain
150 acres was the condition made by'the
plaintiff upon which the l)urchase depended.-McCandless v. Young, 96 Pa.
289; Clark on Contracts, p. 311; Oncieda
Mfg. Society v. Lawrence, 4 ('owen 440;
Jones v. Quick, 28 Indiana 125; House v.
Fort, 4 Ind. 293; Stanley %-.Norris, 4 Ind.
315; Haven v. Neal. 43 IMinn. 315; (roker
v. Lewis, 3 Sir. 1; McLennan v. Ohaien,
75 Cal. 55g.
CHAS. M

MEANS anid LEWELLYN I-IL-

DRETH for the defendants.
1. Where the contract is required to be
in writing, authority of the agent to make
such acontract nmus be in writing.-Huff:
cut on Agency, p. 26.
2. An agent cali only make such warranties -s are customarily made in like
transactions.- Huffut on Agency, p. 110.
3. Where the agentacts within t hescope
of his authority the principal alone is
bound.-Huffcut on Agency, p. 192.
4. If the agent acts beyond the "'cope of
this authority lie alone is bound by such
excessive acts,-Layng v. Stewart, I W.
and S. 222; Ain. and Eng. E'neye., Vol. 1,
p. 1125; Walker v. Haughey 25 Il1. App.
135; Iron Armor Co. v. Bruner, et al, 19
N. J. Eq. 331; Kroeger v. Pitcairn, 101 Pa.
.311; Simmnonds v. Moses, 100 N. Y. 141.
Before Herr, P. J., and Roth J.
STATEMIENT OF FACTS.

Thomas Jessup owned a farm, which lie
desired to sell. His son Israel undertook
to find a purchaser. He ascertained that
Parker was in search of a farni and recommended this. He told Parker that it contained 150 acres and that his father would
sell it for $11,000.
Parker examined ihe
farm, was pleased with it, aind then old
Israel Jessup that lie would buy it ait $11,000if there were in fact 150 acres. Israel
then said that he would guarantee that it
contained so much. Thomas Jessup was
traveling at the time andas Parker wanted
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immediate possession he was allowed to
enter on the farm. Three months afterwards Thomas Jessup returning' he executed a deed for the land and received the
purchase money. He discovered a few
weeks later that the farm contained only
123 acres. He sued Israel Jessup in trespass for deceit, but the judgment was for
the defendant. He then brought this assumpsit against Israel and Thomas Jessup,
on the parol guarantee, claiming $2,500
damages. After the sale to Parker a valuable deposit of lead was found in it, so
that the actual market value of the land
was $25,000.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Herr, P. J.:-Israel Jessup told Parker
that he would guarantee that the farm
contained 150 acres.
This statement
amounted to a warranty that there were
150 acres in the farm. In Jones v. Quick,
28 Ind.125,which was an action for a breach
of warranty, the court laid down the following rules, as being applicable to eases
where the property alleged to have been
warranted is exposed to the inspection of
the party contracting for it. "First. No
particular form of words is necessary to
make a warrant, though the word warrant is generally used. Any assertion of
the seller in respect to the property, if intended by the seller and understood by the
buyer as a warranty, must be considered
as such, whether the word warrant was
made use of or not. Second. When a warranty is relied on the question with the
jury should always be: Do the words
proven fairly show that they were intended
and understood by the parties at the time
of the sale or cxchange, as a warranty? If
they do they must be so considered."
The case of McCandless v. Young, 96 Pa.
289, is analogous to the case at bar. In
that case McCandless by articles of agreement in writing in 1873, agreed to sell and
convey to Simon Young, theplaintiff, one
hundred and eighty-six acres of land, more
or less. A survey was made 20 years after
Young became the owner when it was discovered that there were only 150 acres.
Young recovered the value of thirty-six
acres, the alleged deficiency.
"If a person is thrown off his guard by
a false and fraudulent warranty, it is sufficient to prove the warraiity broken to establish the deceit, for one will be presumed

to know of the-existence or non-existence
of a fact which heundertakesto warrant."
Abraham Nexter v. Gideon Bast, 125
Pa. 53. In an action of deceit the scienter
must not only be alleged but proved, and
the jury must be satisfied that the defendant made the statement relied upon,
knowing it to be false, or with such conscious ignorance of its truth as to make it
equivalent to a falsehood.-Eliza T. Griswold v. George Gettie, et al., 126 Pa. 353;
Kreiter v. Bomberger, 82 Pa. 59.
It might seem at first thought as though
this adtion was not brought against the
right party as Israel and Thomas Jessup
were acting in the relation of agent and
principal and could not be joined as defendants in an action of this kind. However that may have been, we think that,
at this time, the defendants having failed
to plead in abatement at the proper time
and having therefore waived their right
to amend, recovery can be had from Samuel and Israel Je~sup jointly.- Stephen on
Pleading, 50.
The case of MeCandless v. Young is so
analogous to the case at bar that the court,
while sympathizing with the defendants,
hat decided that judgment shall be entered
against the said defendants in the sum of
$1,980.00, which represents the value of 27
acres at $73.333 per acre.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The action is on a parol guarantee, by
Israel Jessup, that the farm to be bought
by Parker contained 150 acres. A former
action, brought by Parker against Jessup,
founded on alleged deceit by the latter in
the making of the representation, was terminated by a judgment for the defendant.
Does this bar the present action? The
parties are the same. Some of the facts on
which a recovery was sought in the former
suit, are facts on which it is sought in this,
e. g., the purchase by Parker, the representation by Jessup, and the falseness of
that representation. But the first action
postulated the presence of deceit; the
present does not. For aught that appears,
the plaintiff failed to recover in the first
action, because he' failed to prove the deceit. He need not prove it here. The adjudication, therefore, is no bar to the present action.-Schriver v. Eckenrode, 89 Pa.
213; 94 Pa. 456; Schwan v. Kelley, 173 Pa.
65; Scheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. 315.
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The difficulty concerning the parol
agency of Israel Jessup is unsubstantial.
liad the action been by Parker against
Thomas Jessup on a contract made between Parker and Israel, acting for
Thomas, the statute of frauds would have
offered an insurmountable obstacle. No
such contract was made. Theconveyance
was direct from Thomas Jessup to Parker.
The guaranty is concerning a fact about
land, and it was made in view of a conveyance of the land. Is it, for that reason,
unenforceable, because not in writing?
The statute of frauds declares that" all
leases, estates * * * of, in or out of any
messuages, manors, lands, tenements or
hereditaments, made or created by livery
and seisin only, or by parol, and not put
in writing and signed by the parties so
making or creating the same • *
shall have the foice and effect of loases or
estates at will only."-1 P. & L. 2191.
These words do not require a guarantee
concerning the quantity of the land to be in
writing.-8 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 704; 2
Reed, Statute of Frauds, 462, 475; Frederick v. Campbell, 13 S. &R. 136; Schriver
v. Eckenrode, 94 Pa. 456. In the last of
these cases an action on such a parol guaranty was supported. In MIcCandless v.
Young, 96 Pa. 289, an action of assumpsit
was sustained on parol deceitful representations as to the quantity.
The present action alleges a guaranty,
and not deceit. The guaranty is proven
that the land :contained 150 acres. The
farm, in fact, contained 27 acres less. There
has been a clear breach. What is the
measure of damages? The plaintiff agreed
to pay $11,000 for 150 acres; or $73.33 per
acre. He has paid twenty-seven times
$73.33 more than he expected to pay ; or
$1,979.91. This, with the interest on it
from the time of the payiment, represents
the damages which he has suffered by
reason of the untruth of the guaranty.
After the sale to Parker, lead ore was
discovered on the land, in consequence of
which its value has risen to $25,000.
Though interesting, this fact is entirely
irrelevant. It does not obliterate the overpayment made by Parker in consequence
of the untrue warranty of Israel Jessup.
Israel Jessup was not the owner of the
land, and itissuggested that for this reason
his oral guaranty cannot bind him. It

does not appear, indeed, how he was interested in the sale, except as any son is interested iiL the business transactions of his
father, lie received no legal benefit from
the sale. But, it is too trite a princi)le to
need more than the bare statement, that
consideration consists as much in detrimerit to the promisee as in benefit to the
promisor. The purchase was made for
$11,000 in reliance on Israel's guarantee.
The action is against Israel Jessup and
Thomas Jessup. The proof shows a guaranty by the former only. The joinder of
the name of the latter was therefore irregular. The act of April 12, 1858, 2 P. & L.
3633, authorizes the courts, "where, by
reason of there being too many persons
included as plaintiffs or defendants by
mistake, as will prevent the cause from being tried on the merits, to permit an
amendment by striking out from the suit
such persons as plaintiffs or defendants."
Under this act the court below had power
to allow -an amendment striking off the
name of Thomas Jessup at any time after
the verdict, as well as before.-Granger v.
Fricke, 57 Pa. 316; Beringer v. Meanor's
Adm., 85 Pa. 223. The common law rule,
that the improper addition of the name of
B to that of A as party defendant in an
action ex contractu, prevented a recovery
by the plaintiff even against A, and that
the error could not be rectified by entering
a nolleprosequias to the party improperly
joined-Gould's Pleading, 260, 261, is thus
abrogated. The court below, however, did
not strike off the name of Thomas Jessup,
but ruled that the defendants had lost
their right to object to the misjoinder by
failing to plead in abatement. This was
an error. The defendants could take advantage of the misjoinder without pleading inabatement under the general issue.
-Gould, Pleading, 260. But what the
court below could do, we can do. The
amendment is therefore allowed, the name
of Thomas Jessup is stricken from the
record, and, thus modified, the judgment
is affirmed.
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JACOB TOME and JACOB HERLOCK
vs. HENRY CHADWICK.
Unauthorizedsatisfactionof a judgmentMisappropriationof the proceeds-Power of an attorney to compromise a claim.
WENCEL HARTMAN, JR., and
AUBREY for the exceptants to the

GEo. W.
auditor's

report cited that:
Chadwick was put upon inquiry before
paying the attorney. He dealt with him
at his peril.-Wise's App., 72 Pa. 351; Watson v. James, 1 Forum 84.
An attorney cannot collect where there
is no one to whom he can pay the money.
Payment may be made before revocation.Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, Vol. 12, p. 149 y.
The payment is therefore a nullity and
the judgment is still open as rdgards Jacob
Tome.-Bald v. Kistler, 4 RawNle 8364; McKinney v. Fritz, 2 W. N. C. 173.
In Pennsylvania. attorneys have wide
discretion and Taylor's attorney had authority to compromise the claim of his client.-Whitehall Twp. v. Keller, 100 Pa.
107; Paistwick v. Poley, 18 C. B. N.'S. 806;
Banney v. Morrill, 57 Me. 368; Starkie, Ev.
.part 4, Vol. 3, p. 1049.
There is no evidence that the authority
to compromise was not given. It is the
duty of the party denying to clearly prove
it.-Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2nd Ed.)
Vol. 3, p. 325.
J. P. WooD and GARRET B. STEVENS,
JR., attorneys for the defendant cited that:
As regards Tome's exception.
When an agent is appointed in a particular business, particular parties dealing
with him in that business have a right to
rely upon the continuance of his authority
until in some way notice of its revocation,
and until then, the principal is liable for
the acts of his agent.-2 Kent Corn., 644;
Miller v. Preston, 154 Pa. 63; Iorgan v.
Stell, 5 Binni. 313.
Before Duffy, P. J., and Persing, J.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Henry Chadwick owned a farm on October 3, 1895, Jacob Tome obtained a judgment against him for $2,000; three days
later, at 8 a. in. Folsom James another
for $1,245, and at 4 p. in. Jenny Taylor
another for $698. The first of these judgments wasmarked "satisfied" on 11 February, 1896, on the record by the attorney of
record, to whom the amount was paid,who,
however, had been discharged by Tome
several weeks before and who had no authority from Tome to make the entry or
to receive the money. This money was
never paid to Tome. After this satisfaction was entered another judgment was
recovered against Chadwick by Jacob Her-

lock for $824. The attorney of record for
Jenny Taylor was also the attorney for
Herlock and in the name of Taylor, and
for the consideration of $100 paid by Herlock to the attorney in expectancy that it
would be paid by him to Taylor, he executed an agreement that in case the proceeds of the Chadwick farm should be insufficient to pay the judgments in full, the
Taylor and Herlock judgments should be
paid ratably. Chadwick's farm was sold
on execution on Herlock's judgment and
the proceeds in excess of costs are $2,190.
The auditor making distribution has denied anything to Tome, has paid in full
the James and Taylor judgments and has
given the balance to Herlock. Herlock
and Tome except.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Duffy, P. J.:-In the present case two
points present themselves for consideration. First. Is Jacob Tome precluded from
sharing in the proceeds of sale? And second. Is the auditor's distribution correct
as regardsJacob Herlock? (1) Was Tome's
revocation of the attorney's authority
binding on Chadwick? A revocation is
effectual and binding only as against those
who have notice that it has been made.
-Hatch v. Coddington, 95 U. S. 48; Insurance Co. v. McCain, 96 U. S. 84; Morgan v. Steel, 5 Binney 313; Packer v.
Hinckley Locom. Works, 1-2 Mass. 484;
ConWright v. Herrick, 123 Mass. 240.
sequently, in order to protect himself the
principal must communicate the revocation not only to the agent, but to all persons who, upon the strength of his previous
authority, are likely to deal with him.Lamothev. St. Louis, &c., Co., 17 Mo. 204;
MeNeilly v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 66
N. Y. 23. The method by which the revocation should be communicated varies
with each particular case, but the notice
must always be sufficient to make the
knowledge of the revocation co-extensive
with the knowledge of the authority. If
sufficient notice has not been given and the
third person has no knowledge of the revocation lie may presume that the agency
still exists, and his subsequent dealings
with the agent are binding and enforceable against the principal.-Lamothe v. St.
Louis, &c., Co., 17 Mo. 204. In the case before us Chadwick, ignorant of the revoca
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tion of the agency and acting in good faith,
paid his judgment, in full to the attorney
ill expectation of it being paid to Tome,
who satisfied it on the records. Is the
payment a discharge of his judgment?
The judgment had been satisfied by a reputable member of the bar after having entered an appearance for the plaintiff. The
money was received by the attorney, but
never paid over to Tome. Aside fron this
when an attorney-at-law enters his appearance in a case and satisfiesajudgment
there is a presumption that he acted by
authority. He is an officer of the court,
and what he does in the course of his business is presumed to be by authority of his
client.-Miller v. Preston, 1.54 Pa. 64.
Where an attorney at law receives payment of a debt, enters satisfaction, but
misappropriates the money, a rule to strike
ofr the satisfaction will not be granted
where a third person had paid the money,
believing him to be the plaintiff's attorney.
-Himes v. Herr, 3 Pa. Sup. Court 124.
We are therefore of the opinion that Chadwick's paynment of the judgment in full to
the attorney, whom lie had every reason to
believe, was acting with tuthority. was a
valid discharge of his debt.
(2) As to the second point. The attorney
of record for Taylor was also the attorney
for Herlock, and in the name of Taylor and
for the consideratio a of $100 paid by Herlock to him in order that it should be paid
by him to Taylor, lie executed an agreement
that in case the proceeds of the Chadwick
farm should be insufficient to pay thejudgmients in full, the Taylorand Herlockjudgments should be paid ratably. In other
words, the attorney, without consulting
his client or paying him the consideration
of $100, agrees to compromise his client's
claim. Is Taylor bound? Has the attorney
power to thus compromise his client's
claim? The general rule is now well settled that an attorney has no power, by mere
virtue of his retainer and without express
authority, to bind a clientby a compromise
of anything intrusted to his care.-3 Am.
& Eng. Ency. of Law (2 ed.) 358. As early
as 1816 we find the law in Massachusetts to
be, that an attorney has no power to compromise his client's claim without his
knowledge, as was so held in Langdon v.
Potter, 13 Mass. 320, and later on in 1822
the same doctrine was laid down in Lewis

v. Ganiage, 1 Pick. 347. The same principle is upheld in N. Y., Lewisv. Duane, 141
N. Y. 302. The lIw is well settled in Pa.
that an attorney has no such power and
beginning with the case of Huston v.Mitchell, 14 S. & R. 307, decided in 1826, there is
a long line of decisions all of the same iiport. Stackhouse v. O'Hara, 14 Pa. 88;
Filby v. Miller, 25 Pa. 264; Housenick v.
Miller, 93 Pa. 514; Mackey v. Miller, 99 Pa.
143; Township of North Whitehall v. Keller, 100 Pa. 105; Isaacs v. Zugsmith, 103 Pa.
77; Brockley v. Brockley, 122 Pa. 1; Jamestown and Franklin R. R. Co. v. Egbert et.
at., 152 Pa. 53. Taylor never was a party
to the contemplated compromise and never
received a consideration to bind him to the
arrangement between the attorney and
Herlock. The principle which underlies
the dootrine stated is that while an attorney
may adopt any course which seems least
calculated to secure the object for which he
was employed, he has no power, by virtue
of his general authority, to bind his client
by an act which amounts to a surrender of
any substantial right.
The exceptions are overruled, the auditor's report is confirmed, and it is ordered
and decreed that the moneys ill court be
paid out in conformity therewith.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR

COURT.

Henmy Chadwick paid the Tome judgnient to Tome's attorney of record. Tils
attorney had, however, been superseded
by Tome. Was the payment nevertheless good? Theattorney'sauthority is not
ipsofacto terminated by the recovery of
the judgment, but he continues until collection. He has primrcfatcie a right to receive payment of it.-McDonald v. Todd,
1 Gr. 17; Miller v. Preston, 154 Pa. 63 ;
Union Bank v. Geary, 5 Pet. 107, 113; Silvis v. Ely, 3 W. & S. 420, 427; Foster v.
Wiley, 27 Mich. 244 (vide discussion by
Cooley, J.). Although the attorney had
been dismissed by Chadwick, )iis ane
continued to appear on the record as such.
Chadwick could properly assume that he
had still the authority of Tome to accept
payment. He cannot, therefore, be compelled to pay a second time. The Tome
judgment is discharged.
The fund for distribution is $2,190. The
James judgment for $1,245, and the Taylor, for $698, were recovered on the same
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day, with an interval between of eigh
hours. They are equal lienI.-1 Liens,
211; 3 Liens, 258. The" fund is suflicient
to pay them in full, and to pay over$200
of the Herlock judgment. But Herloek
insists that he imust share the fund ratably
with Taylor, on account of the agreement
of Taylor, for which he paid the latter
$100. The agreement was made by and
the $100 paid to Taylor's attorney. Taylor
himself has not received the $100; nor did
lie authorize his attorney to make such an
•-rcenment. Was the making of such an
agreement within the attorney's general
powers? We think not. The attorney
cannot postpone the lien of ajudgment.Horsey v. Chew, 65 Md. 560; Fritchey v.
Bosley, 56 Mcd. 97; Wilson v. Jennings, 3
Oh. St. 528. He cannot release the lien.3 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 372. He cannot assign thejudgment.-3 Am. &Eug. Encyc.
369; Rowland v. Slate, 58 Pa. 196; Bosler
v. Searight, 140 Pa. 241. The lien of the
Taylor judgment was a property right,
and the attorney is not empowered to sell
the property of his client.
The attorney for Taylor was also the at
torney of Herlock. In consenting to the
promotion of the Herlock judgment, he
was advancing the interest of Herlock to
thedetrimentofTaylor. Thesame person
cannot act as the agent for parties whose
interests are antagonistic without the consent of both.-1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1073;
Everhart v. Searle, 71 Pa. 256; Connell v.
Smith, 142 Pa. 25. Had the attorney a
general power to postpone the lien of his
client's judgment, he would need special
authorization to postpone it in favor of
himself, or of one for whom he was acting.
The learned court below treated the
agreement concerning the lien of the Herlock and Taylor judgments as a compromise. It was not a compromise. The
numerous cases cited by it on the subject
of compromise are relevant only as applications of the wider principle that the attorney who is employed to obtain a judgment is authorized ipsofacto to collect it,
but not to yield up any portion of it by release, sale, etc.
It follows that the decree of the learned
Court of Common Pleas must be affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH vs. BERT
TRUSTY.
A dimbsion of Eviclencc-cs gcstae.
FnAN. B. SELLERS, attorney for Cominonwealth.
This evidence is admissible as part o
the res gestace.-21 Am. and Eng. Encyof
99; Greenleaf on Ev.,Vol. I., See. 108; Hollinshead v. Allen, 17 Pa. 275; Com. v.
Werntz, 161Pa. 591; Com. v. MePike, 3
Cush. 181; Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 75U. S. 397;
Slagun v. State, 9 Tex. App. 440; Hanover
R. R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. 402; Elkins Bly
& Co. v. MeKean, 79 Pa. 493.
D. EDWARD LoNG, attorney for defendant.
Evidence inadmissible as part of resgestac for the following reasons:
1. The words were not spoken contemporaneously with the fact at issue.
2. The words were spoken at a place
other than where the main fact occurred.

3. The words were not spoken spontaneously.
4. The words were mere narration of a

completed past event.
5. The words depend for their truth
wholly upon the accuracy and reliability
of the deceased and the veracity of the
witness who testified to them.
Authorities cited:-1 Taylor on Ev. 8th
Ed., Sec. 588, 599; 1 Greenleaf on Ev. 108;
Ogden and Wife v. Pa. R. R. Co., 44 Leg.
Int. 144; Chicago West Division Ry. Co.
v. Becker, 128 111. 545; Leahy v. Cass Ave.
and Fair Grounds Ry. Co., 97 -Mo. 165;
Waldele v. N. Y. C. and H. R. R. R. Co.,
95 N. Y. 274; Vicksburg, etc., Ry. Co. v.
O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99.
Before Sadler, S. B., J. P.
STATEMENT Or THE CASE.

On Monday evening, April 4th, a woman
named Kelly received an injury from
,which she subsequently died. In the company of others, including the witness
offered, Martha Duckery, she had visited
a saloon known as the "Shoot." Upon
her return to the house in which she lived
with one Trusty, a quarrel ensued with him
and angry words were heard to pass between them. Soon afterwards a crash was
heard and the deceased rushed down the
stairs with her clothesablaze. She crossed
the street, and entered another house. Not
less than ten minutes after the occurrence
nor more than thirty, she was asked by
Martha Duckery as to how it happened.
It is the reply which was given to this
question that the state urges should be admitted in evidence to charge the accused,
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
-

Sadler, P. J.

Tt is insisted that the declarations of the
murdered wonan must be received as part
of the rcs gc.wtac. Where statements of an
individual are so connected with the facts
as to derive a degree of credit from such
connection, independently of the declaration, they become a part of the transaction,
and are admissible in evidence. They are
are in such cases regarded as mere hearsay.
To be received, however, they must be
contemporaneous with the act which they
are supposed to characterize; "and be well
calculated to unfold the nature and quality
of that which they are intended to explain,
and so to harmonize with it as- obviously
to constitute one transaction."-Enos v.
Tuttle, 3 Conn. 2.50. What statement will
be deemed contemporaneous is a question of
much dispute. An extreme ground has
been takenby the Court in a recentEnglish
case. The question was whether the deceased had been murdered or committed
suicide. It appeared that the deceased
had rtshed from a room in which the prisoner remained with her throat eu t, and had
immediately made a statement. This declaration was held not to be a part of the
res geitae, and hence inadluissible.-Reg.
v. Bedingfield, 14 C'ox C. C. 341. The decision has met with severe criticism-so
severe in fact that the Chief Justice saw
fit to publish a pamphlet in defense of his
position.
But by the great weight of authority in
this country perfect coincidence of tinm is
not required. It is enough that the declaration and the main fact are substantially
contemporaneous; they need not be literally so. "They must be so closely connected
that the statement can in the ordinary
course of affitirs be said to be the spontaneous exclamation of the real cause."Harrinan v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93. Immediateness is not tested by the closeness of time
but by causal relation. - Wharton Evidence, see. 262.
In deciding what events are covered by
the res ycstac, "each case must depend on
its own peculiar circumstances and be determined by the exercise of sound judicial
discretion." - O'Connor v. Railroad, 38
Am. Rep. 28O. The Supreme Court of our
own state has said that the I I declarations

nmust be made under such circuminstances
as raise the reasonable presumption that
they are the spontaneous utterances of
though(s created by, or springing out of
the transaction itself, and whieh arei made
so soon thereafter as to preclude the presuniption that they are the result of premeditation or design.''-Coni. Y. ,erntz,
161 Pa. 591. " le must speak not as the
narrator of a past event, but as a participant in an uncompleted one.'-Coll. v.
Transit Co., 180 Pa. 618.,
There is much conflibt of authority noticed in the reported cases on this subject,
the tendency being to receive any testimony which will shed light on any litigated transaction. Courts desire to explore
every feature of a controversy in order to
expose the inmost merits of the case. Diversity of decisions has arisen partly from
frequent attempts to stretch this rc. gestae
doctrine to cover the peculiar features of
supposed( meritorious cases. An examnination of those in which a similar state of
flicts exist may aid us in arriving at a
proper determination.
Where a wounded juan accused the defendant of shooting idm ten minutes after
the occurrence, and seventy yards from the
scene of the fight, the court declined to admit tlhe declaration.--State v. Estoup, 39
La. AMn. 219.
The court made a similar ruling where
the deceased had gone some distance and
conversed with others, though it was not
more than five minutes later.-Mayes v.
State, 64 Miss. 329.
Declarations made wi thin a few minutes,
two hundred yards from the place of the
trouble, were held inadnissiblein State v.
Rider, 95 Mo. 474.
What the deceased said as to the cause
and manner of injury to one who, hearing
screams, rushed into the house within two
minutes, was held incompetent.-Binns v.
State, 57 Ind. 46.
In Estell v. State, 51 N. J. L. 182, the
narration of the transaction fifteen minutes
after the afihir and after the defendant
had left, was held inadmissible. Beasley,
C. J., says, "If hecould make such a declaration ten minutes after the occurrence he
could do so ten hours afterwards. Nor
does it seem that immediate stateuents
would be more reliable t han those made at
a later period, for while the latter might
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in some cases afford time and opportunity
utes had elapsed since tile occurrence. As
the burden is on the Commonwealth to
for fabrication, it is certain that the former
might be adulterated by reason of the justify the admission of the evidence, we
must assume that the longer of these
vindictive passion unavoidably awakened
periods is the correct one. The act of tile
by the strife or accident, and which
defendants had then been past and we
would have had no chance of becoming
must assume the blaze had been extinal)lpeased."'
In our own state there is a general stateguished a half hour when Mrs. Kelley's
account was given. She had meantim
ment in Hester v. Corn., 85 Pa. 139, that
crossed the street and entered another
declarations of a prisoner to third persons
at a tim( and place distant from the com- house. She was in such a mental state
that a question could be put to her as to
mission of the crime are not admissible as
the causation of the injury, and she could
part of tie resgaetae. Similar dicta appear
in Ogden v. P. I. R. Co., 44 Leg. Int. 133,
give a responsive answer. We think the
court below properly concluded that this
and Railroad v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99.
The case principally relied on by the
answer was not a part of any res gestae
that could be properly inquired into on
counsel for tie commonwealth is Com. v.
Ventz, 161 Pa. 591. Here a statement was
this prosecution.
The cases in the various states are incapamade by the defendant not onlysome time
ble of harmonization. It would be useless
afterwards when tile deceased was carried
to attempt to reconcile them. Ill Ins. Co.
across the street, but during the time of
v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397, as long a time perpassage, as well as in the very room and the
haps after the accident elapsed as here.
very tile of the.occurrence.
In Com. v. McPike, 3 Cash, 181, the cirApplying the rules as laid down by the
cumlstances are not such as to require a
courts to the facts presented in the case at
different decision from what the circumbar, we can come to no other conclusion
stances before us require. Perhaps Earl
than that the declaration of the Kelly woJ. was correct when he said of these that
man was a mere narration to her friend of
they "are extreme cases upon one side."
what had occurred across the street, and
-Waldele v. N. Y., etc., R. R., 95 N. Y.
hence inadmissil)le. See Coll v. Transit
274 We find no Pennsylvania case that
Co., sulrma.
allows the reception of statements so disThe offer is therefore refused.
tant from thechief occurrence. In Ogden
SYLVESTER B. SADLER, P. J.
v. Pa. R. R., 44 Leg. Int. 133, declarations
ADDITIONAL OPINION.
of a boy hurt oil a railroad, made after he
had been carried from the track to the sideThe admission of unsworn declarations
walk, and while he was being taken to the
is entirely exceptional. Thelaw insistsin
almost all cases that narration of event
hospital, as to the cause of the accident
were excluded. In Hanover R. R. v.
shall be made under oath or affirmation
Coyle, 55 Pa. 396, the statement of the enand subject to cross examination from the
person against whom it bears. Dying de- gineer was received, because made immediately after the collision with the wagon
clarations and stateilents which are a part
and in sight of its scattered contents. In
of some relevant res qestae constitute an
exception. The statements of Mrs. Kelley
Elkins v. MeKean, 79 Pa. 493, the story of
were not offered as dying declarations.
the deceased, while he was enveloped in
Were they a part of any relevant res flames, that an explosion of the lamp had
set him afire, was received. In Coll. v.
gestae ?
Easton Transit Co., 180 Pa. 618, the deTrusty is on trial for the murder of Mrs.
claration was made at the very moment of
Kelley, by the hurling of a burning lamp
at her, whereby she was set afire and burned
the accident and at the spot. See also
to death. Any -remarks by Trusty while
Mlullan v. Pa., etc., Steamship Co., 78 Pa.
throwing the lamp, any exclamation or
25. The statements of the deceased made
statement by Mrs. Kelley while the in the room in which he was stabbed and
repeated when he was brought out, and in
physical act was being done, might be
deemed parts of it. When the remarks of
a barber shop on the other side of the street
Mrs, Kelley were. made, from 10 to $0 min- and across a lot to which he was carried
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werereceived in Commonwealth v.Werntz,
161 Pa. 591. They were statements made in
exoneration of the accused. The story
seems to have been continuous from the
time of the stabbing until the final declaration in the shop. Cf. Vicksburg, etc.,
R. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U. S. 99, where
a conversation of the engineer f om 10 to
30 minutes after the accident as to the
speed of the train were. held inadmissible.
The defendant is on trial for his life.
We do not think it sound policy to relax
too much the rule which insists that conviction shall be based on responsible testimony.
JOHN SMITH vs. HENRY JONES.
Appeal from ju.stice of the peace -Time
for filing transcript-uleto strike off
appeal.
G. W.CoLES, attorney for appellee, cited:
That in Pennsylvania the transcript
must be filed by appellant on or before the
first day of the next term, after entering
bail, for an appeal.-Moore v. Creamer, 3
P. & W. 416; Smith v. Walker, 1 W. N.
C. 415.
An appeal entered after return day will
be stricken off, unless good ground be
shown.-Wilson v. Hathaway, 8 Phila.
238; Houk v. Knop, 2 Watts 72; Uhler v.
Ketcher, 1 W. N. 0. 3.
WALTER B. FREED, attorney for appellant, cited :
That the filing of an appeal or transcript
nunc pro tune is favored if good cause for
delay be shown.-Brewster on Practice,
Vol. 1. p. 633; Cochran v. Parker 6 S &
R. 551 ; Woods v. Brolosky, 2 *. N: C.
198; Snyder v. Snyder, 7 Phila. 391.
Before Wetzel, P. J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Summons issued in assumpsit for $57.00,
for wages for manual labor, on January 5,
1898, returnable Monday, January 10, 1898,
between 9 and 10 A. M. Judgment, January 10, 1898, in favor of plaintiff for
$43.06, with waiver of exemption. Defendant appears on January 29, 1898, and
asks for an appeal. Return day, Feb. 7,
1898. Transcript filed Feb. 8, 1898. Feb.
18, 1898, rule on defendant appellant to
show cause why appeal should not be
stricken from record, returnable at next
argument court.
Bail entered by defendant before justice
of the peace. I am held in the sum of
$100 bail absolute in the above case, con-

ditioned for the payment of debt, interest
and costs that may accrue, or that may be
secured legally against the appellant.
L. S. W.
Rule on appellant to show cause why
appeal should not be stricken from record.
Before Wetzel, P. J.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

On January 5, 1898, Henry Smith sued
William Jones before a justice of the peace
for $57.00, wages for manual labor due
him, Smith, from Jones, and on January
10, 1898, judgment for $43.06 was given.
To this decision of the justice of the peace
Jones entered bail for an appeal nineteen
days after the date the judgment was
given. The next return day was February
7, 1898, and the transcript was filed the
day after, February 8, 1898.
Every one has the right to appeal to the
Colirt of Common Pleas from a judgment
of a justice of the peace, providing the
amount involved is not too trivial-under
the sum of $5.33. The mannerof bringing
these appeals is prescribed by the act of
20th March, 1810, 4. The appeal must
be taken by "entering bail within twenty
days after judgment being given, as aforesaid; such appeal shall be effectual, in case
such party appellant shall file the transcript of the record of the justice in the
prothonotary's office on or before the first
day of the next term of the Court of Common Pleas of the proper county, after entering such bail, as aforesaid."
Jones' appeal, to be effectual, must conform to the above statutory provisions, and
Smith has asked for a rule to have the appeal stricken from the record. Whether
or not the appeal will be struck off depends upon its compliance with the statute.
We find that the appeal was taken out in
time, nineteen days after the judgment by
the justice; bail was entered and the transcript filed. But when? The transcript
was filed the day after the return day,
while the statute expressly provides that
the transcript shall be filed with the prothonotary on or before the next return
day. When one wishes to take advantage
of a statute, lie must comply with the
statute. In this case there was a noncompliance, and this is fatal to the appellant.-Houk v. Knop, 2 Watts 72. A time
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must be fixed within which appeals should
be perfected, to prevent undue and vexatious delays on the part of the appellant,
and this time is to the return day following the taking of the appeal.
The argument was not on a rule to allow
an appeal to be made nune pro tune, but
to strike off an appeal already made, so
the arguments and citations of the defendant do not apply. For fatal non-compliance with the statute, the appeal is ineffectual and void. The appeal is ordered
to be stricken from the record. The rule
is made absolute, and the costs are to be
paid by the respondent.
G. FRANK WETZEL, P. J.

12 Pa. 363. A fortiori, when the first return day is more than 20 days after the
justice's judgment, the transcript must be
No excuse for the
filed before or on it.
failure to file the transcript in time is disclosed. The court of common pleas was
therefore correct in dismissing, or striking
off, the appeal.-Houk v. Knop, 2 W. 72.
Judgment affirmed.

OPINION OF SUI?,ERIOR COURT.
The court of common pleas has struck
off the appeal of Smith from the judgment
of the justice. Such act of the court below
being a final judgment is reviewable in
this court.-Beale v. Dougherty, 3 Bhin.
432. Was it right?
The justice rendered his judgment on
January 10th. On January 29th the defendant gave bail and entered an appeal.
The first day of the next following term of
the common pleas was February 7th. The
transcript was filed February 8th.
The 4th section, act March 20, 1810, 1 P.
& L. 2606, requires (a) that the bail to appeal be entered within 20 days after the
judgment, and (b) that the justice's transcript be filed in the prothonotary's office
" on or before the first day of the next
term" of the common pleas. Of these requireinents (a) was complied with. The
appeal was entered on the 19th day after
the rendition of the judgment. It would
have been in time if it had been entered
on the next (ay. But compliance with
(b) was omitted. The transcript must be
filed before or on the first day of the tern
following the appeal, although the 20 days
allowed for appealing are not then exhausted.-Moore v. Creamer, 3 1'. & 1W.
416; Smnith v. Walker, I W. 3X. C. 415; 1
P. &-L. 2608, and if it be not thus filed the
al)peal must be abandoned and another
one taken out within the 20 days, but aft(.r
the intervening return day, if the appellant desires to make a filing before or on
the first return day that follows the expiration of the 20 days after the reii(lel'iIg of
he juilgment efftb.tul.-Potts v. Staeger,

Case stated.
CIIAS. R. WEEKS and WALTER J.
HENRY for the plaintiff.
Where the insured survives those specified to take at his death and no other disposition is made of the insurance money,
it becomes, at his death, a part of his estate to be administered as his will, or in
the absence of a will, as the law may direct.-13 Am. and Eng. Encyc. 6.54; Gambs
v. Covenant Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Mo. 44;
Rindge v. New Eng. Mut. Aid Soc., 146
Mass. 286; Swift v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 96
111. 309; Johnson, et al., v. Van Epps, 110
Ill. 551.
FRANK B. FENTON and CGIAs. G.
MOYER for the defendant, cited:
13 Am. and Eng. Encyc. 654; Richards
on Ins., 44 and 45; Walsh v. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 61 Hun. 91; Continental Life Ins.
Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 60; Baltz's Est.,
12 Phila. 29; Deginther's Appeal, 83 Pa.
337; Anderson's Estate, 85 Pa. 202; Clarke
et ad., v. Equitable Aid Union, 6 C. C. 321.
Before Treibly, P. J., and Pepper, J.

JOHN McFARLANE vs. WILLIAM
AMES.
Policy of L'/fc Insurance-BeneficiaryDeath of Beneficiary before insuredPolicy payable to estate of Beneficia2.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Hobart Reed procured an insurance for
$10,000 upon his life in 1893, the policy
designating his wife as beneficiary. He
continued to pay the premiums thereon
until his death, which occurred on Sept.
11, 1897. On Aug. 9, 1896, his wife died.
leaving three children, who are also clildren of Hobart Reed. Hobart Reed renounced the right to administer on her
estate, and William Ames became the adniiiistrator. John McFarland is the adniinistrator of Hobart Reed. The company
is willing to pay the $10,000, but it is
clainmed by both McFarland and Ames.
This case is stated to obtain thejudgnient
of the court.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

Treibly, P. J.
Hobart Reed designated his wife as beneficiary. Her right to the policy at once
became vested.-Richards on Insurance,
?36. It was within the power of the husba id to make a new appointment upon the
death of his wife- 13 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
654, but that power was not exercised.
Has he done anything which was inconsistent with the continuance of the wife's
vested right? It was urged by counsel for
the plaintiff that his renunciation of the
right to administer on her estate indicated.
an intention to divest the wife's estate of
the benefit of the policy. We cannot see
that it did indicate such intention, and
furthermore, we think such act of renunciation insufficient to effect any other disposition of the policy. The fact that the
wife only is designated as beneficiary
without the words executors, administrators, etc., is not inconsistent with the continuance of her right in her legal representative after the death. Sharswood, J.,
in Deginther's Appeal. 83 Pa. 337, where
the wife was beneficiary, says, "The
words 'executors, administrators and assigns ' were really not necessary under the
policy to entitle her legal representative to
the insurance money."
A husband had insured his own life, and
designated his wife as beneficiary. He
paid the premiums up to the time of his
death, which occurred about three years
after the death of his wife. He did not
exercise his power of appointment at her
death. It was held that the policy belonged to her estate, and passed to her administrator.-Anderson's Estate, 8.5 Pa.
202. See also Clarke et al. v. The Equitable Aid Union, 6 C. C. 321, where a father
designated his son and daughter as beneficiaries. In this case the daughter died
before the father, and after the death of
the latter tie daughter's share of the fund
was claimed by the administrator of the
father and also by the administrator of the
daughter. The case was decided in favor
of the daughter's estate, and half of the
fund, which was her whole share, passed
to her administrator.
The right of the legal representative of
the beneflciary to the proceeds of the policy
seems to be well established.-Deginther's
Appeal, supra; McCutcheon's Appeal, 99

Pa. 133; Hardy's Estate, 12 Phila. 29;
Hurley v. Heist, 86 Ind. 196; Glanz v.
Gloecler, 104 Ill. 573; Washington Central
Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195. Even divorce is not a circumstance sufficient in
itself to divest a wife, designated as beneficiary, of her right to the proceeds of a
policy.-Phcenix Life Insurance Co. v.
Dunham, 46 Conn. 79. The fact that Hobart Reed paid all the premiums on the
policy ukitil his death does not affect the
right of his wife's legal representative to
the proceeds of the policy.-13 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. 654; Anderson's Estate, supra.
It was urged by one of the counsel for
tihe plaintiff that the husband's estate was
at least entitled to one-fourth of the fund
under the intestate laws of Pennsylvania.
This means nothing more than that the
husband's administrator was entitled to
one-fourth of his wife's personal estate
and is an admission that the policy for
$10,000 is part of the wife's estate. The
question is merely one of title to the fund
and as we can see nothing which would
in any way effect the title first vested in
the wife, we are of the opinion that the
$10,000 is part of the estate of Mrs. Hobart
Reed and must be paid to her adininistrator, William Ames.
Judgment for $10,000 in favor of William Ames.
WALTER

G.

TREIBLY.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The money secured by the policy on the
life of Hobart Reed was the property of
his wife. Act April 1.5, 1868, 1 P. & L.
2383; and it would have been hers, although he had been insolvent, either when
he bought the policy or when lie made
payments of premiums upon it -Cf. Act
May 1, 1876; 1 P. & L. 2383; Elliott's Appeal, 50 Pa. 75; McCutcheon's Appeal, 99
Pa. 133; Washington Central Bank v.
Hume, 123 U. S. 195.
The policy does not subject the wife's
right to the contingency of her surviving
her husband. It does not authorize him
to substitute another beneficiary for her.
Nor, indeed, has he attempted thus to
substitute another. When then, she died,
she had a vested right to receive a sum of
money on the happening of an event
which, although it had not yet happened,
was sure to happen. When, subsequently,
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that event did happen the money was payable to her administrator, as any other
money, payable at a time or on an event
that arrived subsequently to her decease,
would have been.-U. B. Mutual Aid Society v. Miller, 107 Pa. 162; Anderson's
Estate, 85 Pa. 202; Deginther's Appeal, 83
Pa. 337; Clarke v. Equit. Aid Union, 6
Pa. C. C. 321; Hardys' Estate, 12 Phila. 29.
It does not appear that Hobart Reed
was insolvent when he paid the premiums,
or when he died. His insolvency could
not divest the estate of his wife in the policy.-Anderson's Estate, 85 Pa. 202; I. B.
Mutual Aid Society v. Miller, 107 Pa. 162.
As a portion of Mrs. Reed's personal
property, the right to receive the money
on the policy passed to her administrator.
When the distribution of her estate takes
place,-which is not yet-her husband's
administrator will be entitled to a child's
share; i. e., one-fourth. Deginther's Appeal, 83 Pa. 337; Anderson's Estate, 85
Pa. 202; Baltz's Estate, 12 Phila. 29.
As the court below made the proper
disposition of the questions involved in
this ease, the judgment is affixrmed.
JACOB ROLAND vs. LOUIS JAMES
AND HENRY HOPPLEY.
Divestiture of mortgage by sheriff's sale.Priorjudgmentnot satisfiedinthe record.
S,irefacias sur mortgage.
SAM H. MILLER and ROBERT P. STEWART for the plaintiff.
J. KIRK BOSLER and MERKEL LANDIS
for the defendants.
There is no evidence that the judgment
had been satisfied at the time of the sheriff's
sale. The judgment, if on record, was notice of a lien to the purchaser at sherifi's
sale.-Magaw v. Garrett, 25 Pa. 319; Coyne
v. Souther, 61 Pa. 456; Readirigv. Hopson,
90 Pa. 494; Saunders v. Gould, 134 Pa. 445;
Meigs v. Bunting, 28 W. N. C. 1; Hughes
v. Torrence, 111 Pa. 617.
The payment of a prior lien, not satisfied
of record, will not protect a subsequent
mortgage from being discharged by the
sale.-Magaw v. Garrett, 25 Pa. 319; Saunders v. Gould, 134 Pa. 455.
A purchaser need not look beyond the
record.-Reading v. Hopson, 90 Pa. 494.
A sale on a lien later than a mortgage, diverts it, if ajudgment precede it.-Trickett
on Liens, Vol. 2, p. 823; Meigs v. Bunting,
141 Pa. 233; Blyers v. Hoch, 11 Pa. 258;
Saunders v. Gould, 134 Pa. 445; Harper's

Appeal, 4 W. N. C. 49; Goepp v. Gartiser,.
35 Pa. 133.
Before Lafferty, P. J.
STATEMlENT OF FACTS.

On the 3rd of May, 1891, a judgment for
$1;000 was entered against Louis James on
a note with warrant of attorney, dated-Nov.
11, 1890. This note was accompanied by a
mortgage, which was put on record on
Nov.12, 1890. Another mortgage executed
on the 16th of June, 1891 for $600 toRoland
was recorded on the same day. On Oct.
23, 1892 the owner of the first mortgage released it, and the release was duly recorded
and minuted on the margin of the record
of the mortgage. On Sept. 13, 1893, William Hamilton obtained judgment for $230
against James, and the land was sold on a
vend' ex' in Feb. 1894 to Harry Hoppley for
$240. This scirefaciasis sued out by Roland against James the mortgagor, and
Hoppley as terre-tenant, to collect the
$600. The defence is made by Hoppley
that the mortgage has been divested. The
land was worth at least $1800, but bidders
were deterred by the liens, not knowing
whether if they bought they would be subject to them or not.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Lafferty, P. J.-The first question to be
considered in this case is, whether or not
the release of the first mortgage also extinguished the judgment entered on a note
for which the mortgage was given as a collateral security. If it does, Roland's mortgage became the first lien on the property
and will not be divested by the sheriff's
sale on a junior judgment.-Act of 1893 P.
L. 110. A note and mortgage taken for the
same debt, though distinct securities and
possessing dissimilar attributes, and subject to remedies which are as unlike as personal actions and proceedings in rem, are
nevertheless so far one that the payment
of either discharges both, and the release
or extinguishment of either withoutactual
payment is a discharge of the other, unless
otherwise intended by the parties.-Nelle
v. Dempster, 179 Pa. 506. But in this case
it is not alleged that the debt was paid, or
that the mortgage was released with the
intention of extinguishing both liens; that
which is not averred must be considered as
not existing.-Seiple-v. Seiple, 133 Pa. 470.
And the first mortgagee had gone one step
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further; the note had been reduced to a lien
prior to the recording of Roland's mortgage, and was a lien against the property
equal to the lien created by the mortgage.
The parties have, unquestionably, in the
case of a double security, the right to extinguish one security and keep the other
alive if they put or leave the record in such
shape as to indicate that they have exercised that right.-Meigs v. Bunting, 141
Pa. 233. The record is undoubtedly intended to give constructive notice to both subsequent mortgagees and purebasers, but as
the record stood was Roland to infer that
the mortgage had been paid and consequently an extinguishment of the judgment, or was Hoppley to rely on record as
being absolutely true? We are of the opinion that the superior equity is in the purchaser. Roland could have protected himself, to a certain extent, if he had given
notice to the first mortgagee, but only so
far as to have given him an action over.MIelvain v. Mutual Assurance Co., 93 Pa.
30. Roland was effected with notice that
there was a mortgage and also a judgment
lien against the property prior to his mortgage, he also knew that a person holding
two securities for the same debt, could release one and keep the other alive. So we
are of the opinion that his day in Court is
past.
2d. Is a purchaser at a sheriff's sale
bound to look further than the records?
The purchaser at a sheriff's sale is
not bound to look further than the records,
he has a right to assume that they impart
absolute verity. Meig's v. Bunting, 141 Pa.
233.
3d. The sale on a lien later than a mortgage, divests it, if judgment precede it.
Trickett on Liens, 2 Vol. 823, 1Ieigs v.
Bunting, Souders v. Gould, 134 Pa. 445.
It was argued by counsel for plaintiff,
that the release of the mortgagee, by the
first mortgage was a fraud on Roland;
however, we can see no fraud, and if there
was, it could not affect an innocent third
person, Clark on Contracts, 352.
The inadequacy of consideration can
have no effect in this case.
Judgment therefore entered for defendant.

OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

on the day of the sheriff's sale at which
Hopley bought the James land, the liens
were, apparently, (1) a judgment (2) a
mortgage; (3) the judgment on which the
sale was made. That sale then, divested
the lien of the first judgment and of the
mortgage, 3 Liens, 321; 2 Liens, 823; unless
the first judgment had been already divested by payment. That judgment had
been accompanied by a mortgage. The
release of this mortgage was prima facie,
a release of the judgment, Meig's v. Bunting, 141 pa. 233.
A judgment or other lien after it has
been paid, becomes as if it had never
been, 3 Liens, 221; 2 Liens, 821, and if
the first judgment was paid the mortgage
became in fact the first lien. Being such,
it would, normally, not have been divested by the sale on the latter judgment.
But, for the purpose of determining what
liens will be divested by a sheriff's sale,
purchasers are affected only by the facts
that appear on the record. Hopley might
assume that the first judgment was unpaid, so long as the record of it disclosed
no payment, and therefore that the sale
at which he bought would give him the
land freed from the mortgage; Saunder v.
Gould, 134 Pa. 445; Magaw v. Garrett, 25
Pa. 319; Coyne v. Souther, 61 Pa. 455; 3
Liens, 221; Reading v. Hopson, 90 Pa. 494;
Hilliard v. Tustin, 172 Pa. 354.
The mortgage however, was marked
satisfied on the record. Was this not
sufficient record notice of the payment of
the first judgment? It was proof that the
mortgage was satisfied, but the omission
to satisfy the judgment was enough to
justify the inference that the creditor did
not intend to release the judgment, and
that it was not in fact paid. Meig's v.
Bunting, 141 Pa. 233. The conclusion that
Hopley was entitled to draw was that the
judgment remained a valid security, and
it was not incumbent on him to verify
this conclusion by inquiring of the creditor. He bought the land therefore, free
from the judgment and the following
mortgage. There is no error in the decision of the learned common pleas,
Judgment affirmed.

